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Abstract 
 
 
Human-induced climate change threatens the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable 
people. Preventing the worst effects of climate change and compensating those 
who will suffer are tasks that should be taken up by individuals, firms and states, 
tasks that constitute a burden. In this thesis I suggest the use of particular 
principles for justly allocating this “climate burden”. I first defend my use of an 
orthodox ethical approach from Dale Jamieson’s challenge that the ethics of 
climate change must be revisionary. I also reply to Luc Bovens’ Lockean argument 
that a history of high emitting justifies giving past polluters more rights to emit. 
Then, I propose a two-track theory under which the climate burden is divided in 
two. These two different parts are allocated by a contribution-based “polluter 
pays” principle and by an “ability to pay” principle. The “fault burden” is the 
burden from greenhouse gas emissions produced since it became reasonable to 
suppose that such emissions were harmful, except for the emissions from the very 
poor, which are not included. The fault burden should be allocated to those who 
have contributed to it, in proportion to their contribution. The “no fault burden” is 
the remaining portion. The no-fault burden should be allocated by an “ability to 
pay” principle which requires all parties (except for the very poor) to shoulder 
burdens that constitute an equal drop in whatever goods we deem most relevant. 
Finally I defend the two track theory from the claim that a “beneficiary pays” 
principle better allocates the burden caused by past emissions.  
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 Introduction 
 
 
 
Climate change…is simply the greatest collective challenge we face as a human 
family. – UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon (2009: line 42).  
 
 
1.1 CONTEXT 
 
We are changing the world’s climate,1 and very many people will be affected. 
Extreme weather events, the decrease in arctic sea ice, ocean acidification, flooding 
from early snowmelt, changes to the natural ranges and growing seasons of many 
species and a rise in average sea level of 2mm per year have all been linked to the 
rise in temperature of 0.7°C since the pre-industrial era (Solomon et al. 2007: 36, 
48; Parry et al. 2007: 28). While the last report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
                                                          
1I am assuming that most of the climate change that is occurring is due to human activity. This 
assumption is well supported by the position of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Solomon et al. 2007) and the opinion of the vast majority of climate experts. A survey 
by Peter Doran and Maggie Kendall-Zimmerman found 82% of earth scientists responding 
were in agreement with the statement that “human activity is a significant contributing factor 
in changing mean global temperatures” (Doran & Kendall-Zimmerman 2009: 22-23). This 
number rose to 97.4% when the sample was restricted specifically to climate experts. The 
authors of the survey conclude that “the debate on the authenticity of global warming and the 
role played by human activity is largely non-existent among those who understand the 
nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes” (Doran & Kendall-Zimmerman 
2009: 23).  
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Climate Change (IPCC) considered the current effect of climate change on human 
health to be “small” (Parry et al. 2007: 43), other studies suggest that the death toll 
from climate change is currently hundreds of thousands each year, particularly 
due to the increased range of malaria-bearing mosquitoes (McMichael et al. 2005).2 
 
 Whatever the effects of climate change are now, they are likely to be much more 
severe in the future, with the IPCC projecting that unmitigated climate change 
would cause widespread negative impacts on almost every feature of the natural 
world we rely on: freshwater systems, food, fibre and wood production, 
ecosystems, and sea level (Parry et al. 2007: 35-47). Nicholas Stern (2007: 139) 
predicts unchecked climate change would cause annual damages equal to several 
percent of world GDP by 2100. 
 
Worst-case scenarios have reinforcing feedbacks (such as the release of methane 
from melting permafrost or the seafloor, the drying and burning of rainforests, or 
reduction in the shininess of the earth due to melting ice) pushing the world into 
“runaway” climate change where these natural warming factors add to the effect 
of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (Hansen et al. 2007) and cause global 
temperatures to rise by even more than the IPCC’s upper bound of 6.4°C by 2100 
(Parry et al. 2007: 70). Because of the possibility of such feedbacks, catastrophic 
climate change, causing warming of 10°C or even up to 20°C, cannot be ruled out 
(Weitzman 2009). A temperature rise above 10°C would probably result in the 
melting of Antarctica (Weitzman 2009), which would raise sea levels by 70 metres 
(Poore et al. 2000). A temperature rise above 12°C would render the regions that 
are home to most of the world’s people uninhabitable due to mammalian inability 
                                                          
2 The World Health Organization estimates that 166 000 people die per year due to the 
contribution of human-induced climate change on malaria, diarrhoea and malnutrition and 
cardiovascular disease (McMichael et al. 2005: 1606). The Global Humanitarian Foundation 
puts the death toll at 315 000 per year, with 300 million having their livelihoods 
“compromised temporarily or permanently by climate change” (Global Humanitarian Forum 
2009: 9).  
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to tolerate wet-bulb temperatures (temperatures adjusted for the cooling effect of 
evaporation) above 35 degrees (Sherwood and Huber 2010).  
 
Even if the temperature rise from climate change is restricted to the 1.1–6.4°C 
range by 2100, the victims of climate change will be huge numbers of the world’s 
most vulnerable people. Not only do the severely poor lack the resources to cope 
with the increased threats to their lives and livelihoods from climate change, but 
regions that will be strongly affected (Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast 
Asia, Latin America, small island states) contain high proportions of very poor 
people (Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF) 2009: 15). Climate change presents us 
with three distinct tasks or duties (Caney 2009a). Some climate change should be 
dealt with by mitigation: restricting greenhouse gas emissions and possibly 
removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. What climate change cannot be 
prevented should be met with adaptation: increasing communities’ resilience in 
vulnerable areas and, where necessary, assisting migration. Finally, those who 
suffer harms from climate change may need to receive compensation from the 
parties responsible. Determining the appropriate mix of adaptation, mitigation 
and compensation is beyond the scope of this thesis (although I argue in Chapter 
Four that we cannot discharge our duties by bearing just the compensation task). 
In this thesis I only assume that some mitigation must be undertaken. The 
combined tasks of preventing the worst effects of climate change through 
mitigation and adaptation, along with compensating those who suffer 
nonetheless, is what I will call “the climate burden”.  
 
For the most part, countries agree that much of the climate burden needs to be 
shouldered by us now. Representatives of 193 countries meeting at the 15th 
Conference of Parties (COP-15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognised a shared goal to “stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system… recognizing the scientific 
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view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius”3 
(UNFCCC 2009). The Green Climate Fund was proposed at the same meeting, 
with rich countries pledging 100 billion US dollars per year4 to poorer countries 
for climate change adaptation and mitigation (UNFCCC 2009). Against this 
background of agreement about the need for us collectively to shoulder the 
climate burden now, a thorny question arises: who in particular should bear how 
much of the burden?  
 
The first agreement on climate change stated that different countries should 
protect the climate system “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”, a principle 
that has been emphasised many times since (UNFCCC 1992: Article 3.2; 2009: 
principle 1). Yet what this principle must mean in practice is not clear, especially 
as rapidly developing countries are in the process of increasing both their 
responsibility for the climate burden and their capability to bear it. The 
aforementioned summit in Copenhagen was widely seen as a vital chance to solve 
the political problem of climate change,5  but fell short of a solution. Countries 
made pledges of emissions reductions that were thoroughly insufficient to meet 
the goal of restricting warming to 2 degrees (United Nations Environment 
Program 2011: 8), and failed to agree on a legal instrument to replace the Kyoto 
Protocol which might hold countries to their pledges. Two years later, the main 
outcome of the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP-17) in Durban was 
                                                          
3 The text is ambiguous as to whether the permitted 2 degrees rise is to be measured against 
current temperatures or pre-industrial temperatures. The latter would mean the goal is 
limiting the rise to a much more demanding 1.3 degrees above current temperatures. Boston 
(2011) argues that even 2 degrees of warming above pre-industrial temperatures is likely to 
constitute dangerous anthropogenic climate change.  
4 For comparison, the OECD spent around 130 billion USD in 2010 on development aid. 
(OECD 2011) 
5 Ban Ki Moon referred to Copenhagen as a “once in a generation chance… to put in place a 
climate change agreement that all nations can embrace” (Ki-moon, 2009). For a typical 
example of the media’s focus on such an event see Ferguson (2009). 
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essentially to delay a decision on how the climate burden should be borne until 
2020 (UNFCCC 2011b).  
 
Representatives of rapidly developing countries such as China and India have 
stated that their countries are doing more than their fair share. At COP-17, Indian 
Minister of Environment Affairs Jayanthi Natarajan said: “We have shown more 
flexibility than virtually any other country. The centrepiece of a climate change 
agreement is and has to be equity, and the equity of burden-sharing cannot be 
shifted... Does climate change mean you give up on equity?” (Natarajan 2011: 
21:59). The Chinese delegate Xie Zhenhua made a similar appeal to equity: "We 
should look at not what is said but what is done. Some countries have made 
commitments but are not meeting them. We are doing whatever we should do. 
We are doing things you are not doing....we are taking actions. We want to see 
your actions" (Xie 2011: 49:00). On the other hand, Todd Stern, Chief Climate 
Negotiator for the USA, sees the current regime as too lenient on rapidly growing 
emitters:  
 
For the past 20 years, there has been a kind of firewall between developed and 
developing countries, most vividly embodied by the Kyoto Protocol, where all real 
obligations for reducing emissions apply to developed countries. If that ever made 
sense, it sure doesn't make sense now at a time when China is already far larger 
than the United States in emissions and will be more than twice our size in this 
decade, and where nearly all the global growth in emissions going forward will 
come from developing countries (T. Stern 2011: para. 3). 
 
The position of any country in international negotiations is influenced (to a 
varying extent) by the beliefs of that country’s citizens. And many citizens of rich 
countries believe that the kinds of domestic institutions which are necessary for 
their country to tackle the climate tasks are unfair. When a carbon tax was 
proposed in Australia, it met with vehement opposition, with 58% of people 
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polled opposing the tax, and only 34% supporting (Benson 2011). In New Zealand, 
proposals that would see farmers bear some of the cost of their substantial 
greenhouse gas emissions are highly controversial (BBC News 2003). 
Corporations, too, appeal to the unfairness of burden-sharing. For example, in 
July 2011 a coalition of US airlines (unsuccessfully) sued the EU over its scheme to 
pass some of the costs of aviation emissions on to airlines flying to and from 
Europe (Harrison 2011). 
 
A consequence of the controversy about who should bear the burdens is that little 
progress has been made towards undertaking the climate tasks. One analysis 
shows that even if countries stick to their pledged emissions of greenhouse gases, 
the world still faces a warming of 3.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Höhne et al. 
2011). The Montreal Protocol, intended primarily to halt the destruction of the 
ozone layer, has had a “side effect” of reducing the greenhouse effect possibly five 
times greater than the agreement intended to reduce the greenhouse effect: the 
Kyoto Protocol (Karoly 2011: 20:36). As far as adaptation and compensation goes, 
the money that was pledged at Copenhagen to developing countries has been 
only slowly forthcoming and has often taken the form of existing aid repackaged 
as climate assistance (Cuming 2011).  
 
Philosophers may have been slow to turn to questions of climate justice,6 but 
recently the subject has been gaining more attention. In 2011 alone an edited book 
(Arnold 2011) and two journal special issues7 were devoted to the ethics of climate 
change. Denis Arnold has suggested that we are now seeing the “second 
generation” of literature on climate ethics (Arnold 2011: 1), in which the claims of 
                                                          
6In 2004 Stephen Gardiner’s review found that “very few moral philosophers have written on 
climate change” (Gardiner 2004: 555). Notable exceptions were Shue (1993, 1999), Traxler 
(2002), Singer (2004) and Broome (1992). 
7These were the Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14 (2) “Special 
issue: Climate Change and Liberal Priorities”, and The Monist, 94(3) “Morality and Climate 
Change”. The Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 69 “Ethics and the Environment” 
was also dominated by papers on climate change.  
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first-generation literature are engaged with and responded to. We are starting to 
see detailed exploration of nuanced questions, including whether the individual 
actions that contribute to climate change are morally wrong (Hiller 2011; Nolt 
2011; Sinnott-Armstrong 2010), whether trading emissions permits is morally 
permissible (Caney and Hepburn 2011; Page 2011b), and the appropriate level of 
warming we should aim to prevent (R. Miller 2010: 109-15). 
 
The question I want to address in this thesis, central to the main conflict in the 
political sphere, is: who should bear what portion of the climate burden?  
 
 
1.2 THE JUST ALLOCATION OF CLIMATE BURDENS 
 
In this thesis I develop a two-track approach to dealing with the burdens of 
climate change, involving a “polluter pays” principle and an “ability to pay” 
principle. Because I approach the question of allocation as a problem of applied 
ethics I must face the challenge that climate change is too far removed from 
paradigm ethical problems to be dealt with using only orthodox ethical concepts. 
This idea has been best articulated by Dale Jamieson (2010). In Chapter Two I 
respond to his argument that the responsibility to bear the climate change burden 
is highly irregular and thus cannot be understood without accepting a duty of 
respect for nature. In response I argue that, while climate change involves several 
special features (such as a complex causal pathway, a time lag between cause and 
harm, and a diverse group of perpetrators) they are not enough, neither alone nor 
in concert, to render climate change significantly non-paradigm. In fact, principles 
of justice play a key role in apportioning orthodox moral responsibility among the 
diverse range of possible duty bearers.  
 
I assume that the principles that determine the just allocation of climate burdens 
need not be limited to allocating burdens among countries. Individuals and 
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corporations have great influence on the eventual positions of states, and these 
parties appeal to claims about justice when they are asked to bear a portion of the 
climate burden. Furthermore, for some particular climate tasks or sub-tasks (such 
as the restriction of greenhouse gas emissions), applying the principles at the level 
of the corporation may be the most effective. For this reason, I will depart from 
much philosophical work (a notable exception is the work of Simon Caney (2005, 
2009b, 2010, 2011)), and consider the just allocation problem as potentially 
applying to many different types of actor – including firms, individuals or 
countries. I will use the catch-all term ‘party’ to refer to such potential bearers of 
burdens. 
 
The primary principle I propose for distributing the climate burden amongst 
parties is a “polluter pays” principle, by which emitters should bear the burdens 
of their own emitting (unless they are very poor). Opposing such a principle is the 
idea that we should “grandfather” emissions rights. This would mean that past 
heavy polluters should bear burdens in less than direct proportion to their current 
emissions. Luc Bovens suggests that we should apply a moderate kind of 
grandfathering on moral grounds, because past emitters have acquired rights to 
emit through historical appropriation. I argue that the kind of Lockean argument 
Bovens makes may be inappropriate to apply to the novel case of distribution of 
rights to emit greenhouse gases. Even if it is appropriate, the long-standing 
violation of the Lockean proviso and the Lockean no-waste condition should, by 
Bovens’ own lights, annihilate such rights.  
 
Chapter Four develops the two-track approach I advocate. An important step, I 
argue, is the separation of what I term the “fault” portion of the climate burden 
(which should be subject to a “polluter pays” principle) from the “no-fault” 
portion (which should be subject to an “ability to pay” principle). Part of the no-
fault burden comes from past emissions produced under ignorance of their 
harmful effects. The other part of the no-fault burden comes from the emissions 
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produced by the global poor, who are unable to bear the burdens of their own 
emissions without suffering harm of a similar scale to that which the climate tasks 
are intended to prevent. The no-fault burden is significant, forming roughly half 
the total climate burden. I argue that it should be allocated by an “ability to pay” 
principle, which asks parties, except those suffering from severe poverty, to each 
bear a similar burden. Due to parties’ different ability to pay, this will translate to 
burdens that are roughly proportionate to such ability. At the end of Chapter Four 
I argue against equal per capita emissions rights as a way of implementing the 
“polluter pays” principle, and turn to an alternative, auction-based scheme for 
applying the two-track approach.  
 
The idea that those who have benefitted from climate change should pay for its 
effects is the main alternative to using an ability to pay principle to allocate the no-
fault burden. I turn to the two forms this idea can take in Chapter Five, and argue 
that, whichever form it takes, it is inferior to the ability-based principle for 
allocating the no-fault burden. In its most plausible form, it states that the 
beneficiaries of injustice have a special responsibility to the victims of the injustice, 
but this form, I argue, is inapplicable to climate change (because no injustice 
created the no-fault burden). If, on the other hand, those who have benefitted 
from merely harmful activity should pay, this would place duties on the current 
beneficiaries of past emissions, but this seems to be an implausible form of the 
“beneficiary pays” principle and I develop counterexamples to it. Finally, I 
describe some special circumstances under which the idea that beneficiaries of 
harmful activity should pay may be applicable. 
 
Allocating the burden of climate change justly is a difficult problem, but it is 
solvable without positing unconventional duties such as a duty of respect for 
nature. Especially important is the recognition of two very different portions of 
the burden – the fault and the no-fault portions. A contribution-based principle 
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should allocate the fault burden, and an ability-based principle the no-fault 
burden.  
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2 
 
Must Climate Ethics Be 
Revisionary? 
 
 
 
Yes, global warming is bad, but it doesn’t make us feel nauseated or angry or 
disgraced, and thus we don’t feel compelled to rail against it as we do against other 
momentous threats to our species, such as flag burning. The fact is that if climate 
change were caused by gay sex, or by the practice of eating kittens, millions of 
protesters would be massing in the streets – Daniel Gilbert (2006: para. 15) 
 
 
2.1 ORTHODOXY OR REVISIONISM? 
 
This thesis makes use of orthodox methods. It uses familiar ethical tools, including 
concepts of responsibilities, rights, interests, harms, and theories of distributive 
justice, to analyse a problem related to global climate change. Further, it is 
anthropocentric; it treats these concepts and theories as applying to humans, and 
does not posit any special duties or responsibilities toward nature directly. 
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There are those who believe that particular features of climate change mean that 
conventional ethical theories are ill-equipped to deal with climate-related 
problems, and that our ethical concepts may need to be revised. Let us call this 
belief the “irregularity thesis”. Support for it comes most obviously from those 
committed to bio-centrism (the view that all life is morally considerable) or 
ecocentrism (the view that ecosystems or the earth itself are morally valuable). 
From such nature-centred views, one could argue that, because climate change 
will have even greater impacts on non-human animals and ecosystems than it will 
on humans, a focus on the harms to or rights of humans will skew our ethical 
reasoning.8 I will not attempt a rebuttal of such views here; this thesis will simply 
assume an anthropocentric perspective. Nonetheless, those convinced by nature-
centric views and their importance in the question of allocation of climate burdens 
may still find this work valuable. Given that many figures in the current political 
debate also take an anthropocentric view, nature-centred thinkers may well wish 
to accept initial anthropocentric moves for the sake of argument, in order to 
explore broadly acceptable conclusions about the nature of responsibilities or 
duties of particular parties.9  
 
Aside from the standpoint of nature-centrism, there are at least two other 
arguments put forth for treating climate ethics as highly unorthodox. One I will 
call the “modern complexity thesis”, and deal with only briefly. Robin Attfield 
affirms the modern complexity thesis, claiming that the “scope and content of 
ethics” must be “reconceived” because widespread industrialisation and 
globalisation has “significantly changed the range of foreseeable impacts of 
human actions and policies” (Attfield 2009: 225; see also Parfit 1984: 86 for a 
similar point). Rather than a genuine argument for the insufficiency of 
                                                          
8 But see Palmer (2011) for the complications involved with this view.  
9 Perhaps, as Bryan Norton (1994) suggests, the practical conclusions recommended in this 
case will be similar no matter what view of the moral standing of non-humans one takes. See 
Norton (1994), especially Chapter 10. See also Palmer (2011). 
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conventional morality for addressing inherently modern problems, the modern 
complexity argument seems to be no more than an account of how such 
insufficiency could come about. It is true that conventional moral theories were for 
the most part developed during a time when the range of an act or policy’s 
foreseeable impacts were predominantly local, but this does not entail that the 
theories must be insufficient to deal with the more extensive impacts of actions 
(such as emitting greenhouse gases) that we see today.  
 
There is a more formidable way in which an argument for the irregularity thesis 
could progress. It could argue for a set of paradigm cases that our ethical concepts 
apply to, and show how climate change differs significantly from such cases in 
ways that make it impossible or very difficult for the concepts to apply without 
revision. If climate change does differ in such ways then we have reason to believe 
that orthodox ethical theory is under-powered and inappropriate when it comes 
to explaining our duties with regard to climate change.  
 
 
2.2 JAMIESON’S ARGUMENT 
 
Dale Jamieson (2010; 2007) makes such an argument. He claims that our 
responsibility to act on climate change cannot be adequately explained in purely 
prudential, moral or political terms, and this exhausts the way standard moral 
theories can account for such responsibility.10 Jamieson’s conclusion is not that our 
collective responsibility to deal with climate change is weak or non-urgent, but 
rather that this responsibility arises from a duty (compatible with 
                                                          
10 Although Jamieson says little to define responsibility, he does say something to characterise 
it. By practical responsibility, Jamieson refers to what we are “responsible for doing”. I might 
have a responsibility to get to work on time, or to call my girlfriend, or to donate to an 
earthquake appeal. Practical responsibility can be plural: “one act can discharge multiple 
responsibilities” (2010: 433) and layered: “agents can have practical responsibilities at the 
different levels of social organization at which they are causally efficacious” (2010: 433).  
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anthropocentrism) of respect for nature. Jamieson makes a tripartite classification 
of responsibility into moral, political and prudential responsibility. For Jamieson, 
prudential responsibility “centres on responsibilities one has to oneself” (Jamieson 
2010: 432)11. In its paradigm case, it involves a single agent acting on the basis of 
her own self-interest. Ethical responsibility, comprised of “moral” and “political” 
responsibility, concerns our responsibilities to others (433). I will not say much 
about Jamieson’s claim that climate change offers us a non-paradigm case of 
prudential responsibility, since discharging our duties to ourselves is not the main 
goal of a just allocation of climate burdens. Rather I will present Jamieson’s 
arguments that climate change strays significantly from conventional standards of 
moral and political responsibility. I then reply to these arguments in Section 2.3.  
 
 
2.2.1 Moral Responsibility? 
 
According to Jamieson one of the central ways in which an agent acquires moral 
responsibility is by directly causing identifiable, intentional harm locally. An 
example of this is an agent “Jack” stealing a bicycle from a victim “Jill”, which 
Jamieson calls “Example 1” (436). We can imagine a case differing from the 
paradigm case of Example 1 along one or more relevant dimensions. Jamieson 
writes:  
 
Consider some further examples. In Example 2, Jack is part of an unacquainted 
group of strangers, each of which, acting independently, takes one part of Jill’s 
bike, resulting in the bike’s disappearance. In Example 3, Jack takes one part from 
each of a large number of bikes, one of which belongs to Jill. In Example 4, Jack 
and Jill live on different continents, and the loss of Jill’s bike is the consequence of 
a causal chain that begins with Jack ordering a used bike at a shop. In Example 5, 
                                                          
11 Direct quotes from this work will be referred to solely by page number for the rest of this 
chapter.  
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Jack lives many centuries before Jill, and consumes materials that are essential to 
bike manufacturing; as a result, it will not be possible for Jill to have a bicycle. 
While it may still seem that moral considerations are at stake in each of these 
cases, this is less clear than in Example 1, the paradigm case with which we began. 
The view that morality is involved is weaker still, perhaps disappearing altogether 
for some people, if we vary the case on all these dimensions at once. Consider 
Example 6: acting independently, Jack and a large number of unacquainted people 
set in motion a chain of events that causes a large number of future people who 
will live in another part of the world from ever having bikes. (Jamieson 2010: 436 
and a similar passage in Jamieson 2007: 476-477 ) 
 
Jamieson claims that our sense that Jack has an urgent duty to remedy the harm 
he is linked to diminishes, and perhaps disappears, as we descend from Examples 
2 through 6. Yet, Jamieson argues, it is Example 6 that is most similar to the case of 
climate change, which suggests that if we feel that the problems of climate change 
do generate urgent duties, these arise from a source other than orthodox morality.  
 
At this point it will be fruitful to explore the similarities between climate change 
and Jamieson’s Examples 2 through 6, to see just what features are supposed to 
make the case of climate change irregular in the same way that Example 6 is. I will 
present a list of five different features of climate change that I take Jamieson to be 
stressing as the features that make both Examples 2-6 and climate change 
irregular. They can be found by examining the range of examples and seeing 
which feature or features of climate change each example stresses.  
 
In Example 6, Jack is part of a large, unacquainted group of strangers. Similarly, 
Jamieson suggests, the group that is causing climate change is very large indeed, 
and does not form a distinct, organised collective. It is hard even to identify a 
group of unorganised perpetrators, for the world does not divide neatly into those 
who emit greenhouse gases and those who don’t. Even if a group of perpetrators 
could be identified, Jamieson might argue, differences within the group are 
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significant. Some emitters have died, while others are currently alive. Some 
produced emissions lacking knowledge of their harmful effects; others did so with 
comprehensive knowledge of such effects. Some emitters may be in circumstances 
(high latitudes, low access to alternative energy sources) where they need more 
emissions to meet their basic needs, others in circumstances where they need less. 
Some emitters find themselves embedded in societies that have become 
dependent on dirty technology, others do not. These differences, Jamieson might 
argue, compound the vague boundaries of the group and make it difficult for 
orthodox approaches to attribute moral responsibility to the group or its members.  
 
The dispersed and diverse group that causes climate change, Jamieson argues, 
makes climate change more irregular than Example 1, but it is far from the only 
difference that Jamieson’s Examples 2-6 highlight. In Example 6 and the bridging 
case of Example 5, Jack will harm future people. This is mirrored in the case of 
climate change, Jamieson points out, because climate change is a “lagged” 
problem (Gardiner 2006: 402). Some of the carbon dioxide we emit now will warm 
the earth for centuries to come. Prominent damage assessments put most of the 
worst effects of climate change after 2100 (N. H. Stern 2007: 55-84). To further 
complicate matters, future generations may be far better off than we are due to 
continued economic growth (Mendelsohn 2006).  
 
A third potentially irregular feature of climate change that Jamieson’s passage 
above emphasises is that, as in Examples 4, 5 and 6, the connections that link 
individuals’ actions to the eventual harm are via a long “chain of events”. To 
begin with, it is not the emissions we create or even the rise in global average 
temperature we are indirectly causing that harms people, but rather the systemic 
effects of temperature rise on the natural environment that do. Further, many acts 
of emitting cannot be linked to a single actor. An example would be the embedded 
emissions created by the manufacture of (say) a lounge suite I purchase. I am not 
producing the emissions in this case, but merely adding to the demand for such 
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products. The manufacturer who has emitted greenhouse gases in making the 
lounge suite may or may not have been subject to regulations on energy efficiency 
set by a state, which is now involved in the causal chain, along with the 
manufacturers and suppliers of the glues, fabrics and wood used in the lounge 
suite’s construction.  
 
Fourth, Jamieson’s Examples 5 and 6 are supposed to highlight the difference that 
lack of intention to harm can make. In these examples, Jack lacks the intention to 
harm, and intention to harm is also absent in the case of climate change. Past 
emitters did not intend or even foresee the harm that would occur from their 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Even now, when we know that driving cars or 
using fossil-fuel generated electricity contributes to the greenhouse effect, it is 
strange to say that a person intends to cause the hurricanes, drought or sea-level 
rise that will harm future people when she drives her car or runs a bath.  
 
The fifth supposedly irregular feature of climate change that Jamieson’s examples 
remind us of is that the effect of the emissions from small-scale parties such as 
individuals (or small corporations) is each a tiny contribution to a problem that 
emerges only through the aggregation of a multitude of such contributions. 
Jamieson’s Example 2 has Jack taking only “one part” of Jill’s bike, and the harm 
of the lost bike only arises when a large number of other people do the same (436). 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong pushes this idea more forcefully. He argues that the 
effect caused by an individual’s act of emitting is non-existent, because it is only an 
infinitesimal part of an effect that only causes harm when it passes a threshold. 
One Sunday drive (say) does not release enough CO2 to raise the temperature of 
the globe by any amount at all. Even if it did raise the temperature infinitesimally, 
it is systemic climate change that causes the harm to people, not gradual change, 
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and “no storms or floods or droughts or heat waves can be traced to my 
individual act of driving” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010: 336).12 
 
We understand conventional moral responsibility and feel it most urgently, 
Jamieson argues, when we consider an individual causing harm to another 
individual, intentionally, directly, immediately and locally. The harm from 
climate change, like the harm in Examples 2 through 6, varies from this paradigm 
in many dimensions: the lack of an individual perpetrator and intention to harm, 
the causal complexity, and the distance in time and space between the 
perpetrators and the victims. Thus climate change, according to Jamieson, is far 
enough from the paradigm of moral responsibility that orthodox ethical 
approaches fail to gain traction. 
 
 
2.2.2. Political Responsibility? 
 
I have presented and developed Jamieson’s argument that climate change is far 
removed from paradigmatic moral problems involving direct harm, so moral 
responsibility of this type may be hard to trace using an orthodox approach. But 
Jamieson also recognises that individual moral responsibility for direct harms 
does not exhaust the types of ethical responsibility. He refers to a different kind of 
ethical responsibility: “political responsibility” (438). While Jamieson admits 
political responsibility plays some role in the ethics of climate change, he argues 
that the problem of climate change is sufficiently non-paradigm that orthodox 
approaches to delineating political responsibility will be inadequate to explain our 
                                                          
12 There is a philosophical response with a famous pedigree that suggests itself here, but it is 
unclear whether it is capable of helping those proposing an orthodox approach to climate 
change . Famously, Parfit has argued that it is a “mistake of moral mathematics” to assume 
that an act's morally relevant effects need be traceable to that act’s particular effects, especially 
if that act belongs to a set of harmful acts (Parfit 1984: 67-83). But importantly, Parfit sees his 
argument as being revisionary, and makes the same kind of historical apology for our moral 
conventions (or rather “mistakes”) as does Attfield.  
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duties on climate change. His conclusion is that “the problems that climate change 
presents us with stray from the paradigm of global justice” (439) and thus the 
claim that climate change involves a strong instance of political responsibility 
must be revisionary.  
 
Jamieson provides no definition for either “political responsibility” or “global 
justice”, but does provide an example of a paradigm problem of global justice, 
presumably one that results in clear political responsibility. Such a paradigm 
problem is “a country unjustly invading another country” (439). The case for 
political responsibility “becomes stronger” when we consider the plight of 
particular countries that will suffer the most from climate change: Bangladesh and 
small island states, for example (438).  
 
Yet, Jamieson argues, while some countries may be clear losers from climate 
change, climate change differs from paradigm problems of global justice in 
“several important respects” (439). One respect Jamieson explicitly mentions is the 
geographically and politically dispersed nature of the perpetrators and victims of 
climate change: “[s]ince the atmosphere does not attend to national boundaries 
and a molecule of carbon has the same effect on climate wherever it is emitted, 
climate change is largely caused by rich people, wherever they live, and is 
suffered by poor people, wherever they live” (439). He cites the high numbers (in 
absolute terms) of car owners in relatively poor countries such as India and China, 
and the disproportionate suffering of the poor in rich countries (such as in the 
USA when Hurricane Katrina struck) as examples of this. On Jamieson’s view, the 
groups of perpetrators and of victims of climate change cross national boundaries, 
are vague and ill-defined, and perhaps are not even collectives at all. As well as 
the dispersed nature of perpetrators and victims, the other features which make 
moral responsibility problematic might also affect our attribution of political 
responsibility, especially the time lag and the lack of intention of perpetrators. The 
responsibility of current states for past transgressions is a controversial topic (cf. 
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D. Miller 2004; Posner and Weisbach 2010: 115), and unintended harmful 
consequences of state actions also do not neatly invite attributions of political 
responsibility for those harms.  
 
Jamieson’s argument is that climate change strays from the paradigms of political 
and moral responsibility to such an extent that we cannot understand our 
obligations without providing a revisionary analysis. It is not a conventional 
political problem primarily because the persons that are most responsible for 
climate change are scattered among the globe and belong to different political 
units. Climate change is not a conventional moral problem because it differs from 
the paradigm case of direct, local harm on many dimensions. Thus he concludes 
by affirming the irregularity thesis – that climate change is a case that requires our 
concept of ethical responsibility to be “revised” or “extended” (Jamieson 2010: 
439). 
 
Jamieson’s revisionary response to the irregularity thesis is to draw on what he 
claims is an “under-theorised and [under]-defended” duty of respect for nature 
(443). According to Jamieson, this need not be based on a “morally extravagant 
view such as biocentrism or ecocentrism” (443).13 That we have some duty to 
respect nature may be plausible. But the question of allocating the burdens of 
climate change is difficult enough as it is, and we should be wary of building any 
analysis of climate justice on such contestable and unexplored territory as a duty 
of respect for nature (whether such a duty is compatible with anthropocentrism or 
not). As indicated earlier, I wish to develop an account of the ethics of climate 
change that draws on principles of justice that lie within the realm of orthodox 
ethics, principles that have been discussed in general terms outside of the 
environmental context (Butt 2007; D. Miller 2001). Consideration of central ethical 
                                                          
13 Jamieson gives four arguably anthropocentric reasons (apart from the motivation due to the 
moral urgency of climate change despite its irregularity) why we might have a general duty to 
respect nature. But my purpose here is not to investigate the grounds for a duty of respect for 
nature, but to reply to the idea that climate ethics must be revisionary.  
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concepts such as individuals’ vital interests and moral responsibilities play central 
roles in my argument. The strategy of this thesis is thus to apply orthodox ideas 
about ethical responsibility to climate change, not to revise them. The next section 
will present a case that such a strategy can be sufficient to answer the question of 
the just allocation of climate burdens.  
 
 
2.3 A REPLY TO JAMIESON’S ARGUMENT 
 
We have seen Jamieson’s argument for the irregularity thesis, and that he suggests 
our urgent duty to act on climate change should be derived in part from a duty to 
respect nature. We need not accept either conclusion. I believe Jamieson gives too 
little attention to orthodox principles that attempt to share responsibility justly for 
urgent moral tasks. Here in Section 2.3, I will propose that principles of burden-
sharing can dissolve some of the particular difficulties that climate change poses to 
orthodox ethics, and that those which remain are not significant enough to require 
a revisionary approach. Finally, in Section 2.4, I will point out some features of the 
burden-sharing approach which make it more rather than less urgent for parties to 
bear their portion of the climate burden.  
 
 
2.3.1 Principles of Burden-sharing 
 
A way forward against Jamieson’s argument for the irregularity thesis involves 
two steps. The first is to treat the importance of dealing with the climate burden as 
a brute fact (after all, a situation in which the poor of the tropics have their lives 
and livelihoods devastated by anthropogenic climate change caused generations 
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earlier seems in urgent need of rectification).14 The second is to propose a principle 
(or more plausibly, principles) that can transform the urgent duty of humanity in 
general to meet the climate burden into more clearly delineated ethical 
responsibilities of specific parties.  
 
Human induced climate change presents us with an unacceptable situation. If 
climate change is not mitigated, people’s vital interests will be adversely affected 
by extreme weather, sea level rise and disruption to ecosystems (Parry et al. 2007: 
28). Thus their vital interests should be protected through the tasks of mitigation 
and adaptation. Furthermore if we do not mitigate climate change, we risk truly 
catastrophic or runaway climate change that would severely threaten the ability of 
civilisation to survive at all (Hansen et al. 2007; Sherwood and Huber 2010; 
Weitzman 2009). For us to let people (albeit indirectly) harm other people in the 
ways described above without attempting intervention would be morally 
unacceptable. Perhaps exactly who should take up how much of the climate 
burden and why is not immediately obvious. We can however turn to principles 
of burden-sharing to answer these questions. I will develop arguments for 
particular principles of burden-sharing later in this thesis, but what I want to 
argue now is that we can use such principles to explain the urgency of our ethical 
responsibility to deal with climate change without a revisionary approach.  
 
Burden-sharing to remedy an unacceptable situation is not an unorthodox or 
irregular proposal. Such distribution of “remedial responsibility” might occur 
when we consider any case where a situation requires urgent remedy: for 
example, when we consider who had responsibility to aid the Iraqi children 
harmed by economic sanctions on Iraq (D. Miller 2001: 453ff). Singer (2004) uses 
the more prosaic example of finding the bathroom sink blocked by hair; again, the 
situation demands remedy, and we can plausibly turn to principles to decide who 
                                                          
14 Note that Jamieson also helps himself to the notion that the need to remedy climate change 
is urgent in his argument for a duty of respect for nature.  
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should clean it up. In these cases our model might be similar to the apportioning 
of legal liability, (but not strict liability, as I will argue in Chapter Four) rather 
than moral culpability.15 Assigning legal liability and remedial responsibility both 
involve distributing burdens rather than punishment, and share a purpose: to 
ensure that the victims do not bear the entire burden themselves. In this thesis I 
take it that burden-sharing principles can apportion moral responsibility to the 
parties involved in climate change.  
 
 
2.3.2 Delineating Groups 
 
The problem of allocating the climate burden would stray far from orthodoxy if 
we could not identify who should bear the burdens. So a key role for principles of 
burden-sharing is to delineate the parties involved more clearly. It does not matter 
if there is some vagueness regarding the size and shape of the initial collective 
amongst which we are distributing responsibility. All that is needed to start 
applying the principles of burden-sharing is a rough idea of who could bear 
responsibility. The broad notion that some collective of humans is responsible for 
a particular problem is enough to begin such an application; principles of burden-
sharing will bring the parties who actually bear specific responsibility into clearer 
focus. 
                                                          
15 Jamieson briefly responds to the idea that responsibilities to deal with climate change are 
best understood as the acceptance of fault liability (where negligence is needed to apportion 
burdens). His argument is that it is hard to see climate change being a case of individual 
negligence when there is widespread distrust of climate science. People, he argues, are not 
acting negligently if they don't believe their behaviour is contributing to any harm. 
Furthermore, this false belief is not the fault of individuals, but the fault of a faulty science 
education system and the pronouncements of public figures. This issue becomes somewhat 
tricky, but against Jamieson I would argue that negligence is a good way to characterise the 
emitting of collectives of high emitters today. Perhaps in some countries, where awareness of 
the effects of greenhouse gas emissions is not widespread, this once again shifts a climate task 
to broader collectives to ensure that science education is adequate, but the overall analogy 
with liability is not seriously threatened.  
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To take an example, we might begin with the vague notion that “some of us” are 
practically responsible for the high rates of rheumatic fever in New Zealand. As 
more about the problem is learnt, certain groups or individuals may be identified 
by a principle based on contribution to the problem. Perhaps particular parenting 
practices are the cause, perhaps there is some individual spreading the related 
bacteria, perhaps it is due to our poor insulation, which is partly the fault of the 
Department of Building and Housing. Or maybe the causes are too diffuse and a 
capacity-based “ability to pay” approach is most just. In any case, some groups 
will be determined by the application of the relevant principles. The group or 
groups now delineated may still have unclear boundaries, but we face such 
problems of vague borders in most problems of applied ethics, and climate change 
should not be deemed any less orthodox for that reason. Fundamentally the 
amorphous nature of the collective before the application of distributive principles 
is not enough to render problems like these unprecedented, or even significantly 
non-paradigm.  
 
How might groups be picked out by principles in the case of climate change? 
Recall the problem that the group of emitters was diverse and did not form a 
political unit. We can however, through a contribution-based or “polluter pays” 
principle, link the proportion a party emits with the responsibility to bear a 
proportion of the burden. Jamieson recognises that “a molecule of carbon has the 
same effect on climate wherever it is emitted”. This fact about the insensitivity of 
circumstance to the effect of acts of emitting allows, at least in theory, a clear 
relationship to be drawn between proportionate emissions and proportionate 
responsibility. If you and I are the only emitters of greenhouse gases and my 
emissions came to three tonnes of CO2 last year and yours one tonne, it is 
plausible to suggest I am responsible for 75% of the climate change caused by that 
year's emissions. Of course once we introduce multiple types of actors 
(corporations, states, individuals) and consideration of the epistemic and socio-
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economic situations of different emitters across time and space, the allocation of 
proportionate responsibility for the climate change burden will become much 
more complex. I will explore these issues in Chapter Four. But it is important to 
note for now that the direct link between each additional unit of greenhouse gas 
emitted and the increase in risk makes proportionate responsibility applicable to 
climate change.  
 
At this point, it is worth noting that if we can determine, even approximately16, the 
relative shares of the climate burden for different parties, we gain a level of 
precision that increases the ethical force of the responsibility to bear such burdens. 
Often, the level of causal responsibility for an unfortunate event will be 
impossible to appropriately quantify. For example, it is unclear how much 
responsibility I bear when I serve a drunk patron (whom I suspect to be somewhat 
likely to drive home) who then kills someone in a road accident. Perhaps legal 
procedure might assign some exact percentage of proportionate responsibility, but 
very often it is hard to express the moral responsibility in any more precise way 
than saying I have “some” responsibility, or perhaps a “major” or “minor” 
responsibility. In the case of climate change, however, the scientifically 
demonstrable graduated effect of a multitude of small contributions allows us, at 
least in theory, to specify the relative responsibility of each contributor. Likewise, 
if parties’ relative ability to pay was the measure by which responsibility should 
be distributed, the degree of precision available in measuring this ability may 
again render climate change more tractable as an ethical problem compared to 
many smaller-scale cases of burden-sharing.  
 
                                                          
16 In some cases it may be difficult to judge the amount of greenhouse gas emissions any 
particular actor is responsible for, as I noted in sub-section 2.2.4. Still, the “carbon footprint” 
of activities as diverse as sending a text message to buying a new car has been estimated with 
some accuracy (Berners-Lee 2011). Alternatively, a global economic instrument (such as an 
auction-based scheme of emissions restriction that requires firms to purchase permits in order 
to remove fossil fuels from the ground) could allow all emitters to bear costs in rough 
proportion to their use of fossil fuels. See Chapter Four for a description of such a scheme. 
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Once we have dealt with the difficulty of identifying duty bearers by proposing 
principles that will be able to apportion responsibility on the basis of, for example, 
parties’ causal contribution or ability to pay, I suggest that the other apparently 
special features of the case of climate change become amenable to orthodox ethical 
analysis as well. The other features that Jamieson raised were the complexity of 
the cause, the lack of intention to harm, the temporal lag between the cause and 
the harm, and the infinitesimal nature of the contribution that a single individual 
makes. I will argue that, if proportionate responsibility can be distributed, none of 
these other features undermine the idea that such responsibility to bear the 
climate burden is an instance of orthodox ethical responsibility 
 
2.3.3 Time Lag 
 
Jamieson suggests that the responsibility to deal with climate change is irregular 
because the ill effects occur in the future. In his Example 5 he asks us to consider a 
case in which the agent, Jack, lives “many centuries before Jill, and consumes 
materials that are essential to bike manufacturing; as a result, it will not be 
possible for Jill to have a bicycle” (436). In this, and in Example 6 (in which future 
people are prevented from having bikes by Jack and a group of strangers) our 
sense of the urgency of Jack’s duty is diminished, compared to Example 1, in 
which Jack harms Jill immediately. This may be so, but here two factors may be 
confounding our judgement: the type of harm that the future people are suffering 
and the precision with which we can trace the cause of the harms. In examples 5 
and 6, we only know that Jack indirectly deprives someone of resources, rather 
than contributes to threats to her vital interests or her life. Responsibility for these 
latter, more serious types of harms may be insensitive to time lags. As Stephen 
Gardiner (2011) points out, someone who places a time bomb under an 
elementary school is clearly culpable whether the detonation is set for 100 seconds 
or 100 years.  
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If we see climate change as jeopardising the basic interests of future people 
(whomever they turn out to be) such jeopardy can be caused inter-generationally 
(Caney 2009b). A typically consequentialist approach to the problem, involving a 
commitment to impartiality, is even less likely to discount harms simply because 
they are in the future (Broome 1992: 92-108).  
 
Additionally, in Examples 5 and 6, the degree of confidence with which we can 
say that the perpetrators will actually cause harms is low. It seems plausible for 
the perpetrators in such cases to argue that we cannot know that people will be 
prevented from having bicycles due to their consuming materials essential to bike 
manufacturing, because the requirements of future people for specific resources 
are so hard to predict. Linking future climate-related harms to present emissions 
is different in this regard. We know that greenhouse gases cause global warming, 
and we know, or can find out, the approximate relative contributions to global 
warming from many parties. While we cannot predict any particular future harm, 
we can be fairly certain that serious harms will be caused by increasing the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Thus climate change 
presents more of a paradigm moral problem than Examples 5 and 6, despite the 
harms being located in the future.  
 
There is one aspect to the time-lag involved in climate change that does raise 
problems for the distribution of climate burdens. The different levels of 
knowledge about the effects of greenhouse gases (call these the “epistemic 
conditions”) of parties who emitted in different eras suggest that apportioning 
responsibility cannot be a simple matter of assessing contributions to the problem 
and assigning burdens accordingly. I will return to this problem especially in 
Chapters Four and Five, and I will touch on what may be the best strategy for 
dealing with it only briefly below.  
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The different epistemic conditions of parties in different eras may just mean that a 
singular principle of justice will not adequately distribute the burdens of 
emissions. There are different portions of emissions (for instance, the portion 
emitted under excusable ignorance, and the portion emitted once the science of 
climate change was well-accepted) and the climate burden is constituted out of 
those different portions. But there seems to be no reason why we cannot use 
different principles of justice to allocate these different portions of the climate 
burden. We can imagine instances in which we might use several principles to 
distribute a burden fairly at smaller scales. Thomas Pogge describes an 
illuminating example of burden-sharing: imagine you have gone on a vacation in 
a developing country, and with four others have organized a beach party with 
fireworks. You ran the bar for your own account and made a tidy sum. The 
fireworks display, however, destroyed a boat – a very poor local family’s only 
means of income. Legal authorities are not getting involved; the responsibility 
involved is a moral one. Pogge concludes that each of you has a responsibility to 
pay one-fifth of the cost of a new boat. But if the situation changes and several of 
your collaborators won’t pay, it seems plausible that you have the responsibility to 
provide the remaining funds, because you have benefitted directly from the beach 
party (Pogge 2005). Here we have a two-track approach involving a contribution-
based principle and a “beneficiary pays” principle. You are meeting a special 
portion of the burden, that created by your friend’s refusal to pay, and the two-
track approach lets that portion be distributed fairly. The moral obligation seems 
to be standard enough, without a revision of moral responsibility. 
 
Similarly we can use multiple principles to distribute the costs of climate change. I 
am not here arguing for a particular combination of principles (I do so in Chapter 
Four) or suggesting a close correlation between the example of the beach party 
and climate ethics. All I want to show is that variation in the epistemic 
circumstances of contributors from different eras could be dealt with by the 
application of multiple principles for the portions of the burden that originated at 
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different times. This does not require revision of the concept of ethical 
responsibility.  
 
 
2.3.4 Complexity of Cause 
 
Recall that Jamieson suggested that the complexity of the causal pathway makes it 
difficult to assign responsibility to individuals for a share of the climate burden. 
This is mirrored in Jamieson’s Example 6 with its reference to a “chain of events” 
that causes a large number of future people to suffer deprivation.  
 
In response, it is worth noting that many of the causal pathways involved in 
climate change are made up of only a few steps. States might decide whether or 
not to apply restrictions to greenhouse gas emissions and large corporations 
whether to concentrate investments in clean or dirty energy. Individuals might 
choose to take or refrain from actions with a large carbon footprint such as 
building a house or taking a job that requires commuting daily. By some of these 
acts, such parties can be causally linked to climate change relatively directly 
through the associated increase in greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
More fundamentally, however, a complex chain of events, where the victim is 
indeterminate and far removed from the agent, need not mean that the sense of 
moral responsibility placed on the perpetrator be watered down at all. John Nolt 
(2011) gives the example of someone making sexist or racist comments. In this 
case, the potential victims of bigoted talk are those who would be harmed through 
the complex causal mechanisms of the fostering of prejudicial attitudes in oneself 
and others. These attitudes in turn affect people’s actions which can cause tangible 
harm. Bigoted talk merely increases the possibility that a distant individual will be 
harmed through a complex causal chain, involving the actions of other agents. 
Nevertheless, if we are convinced that bigoted talk raises the probability of harm, 
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we may have no qualms about saying that for this reason, the person who is 
talking unfairly has a clear moral responsibility to stop.  
 
The challenge of climate change is not irregular due to the complexity of its cause 
– some of the causal chains are not very complex, and the causal chains that are 
complex need not undermine the apportioning of responsibility.  
 
2.3.5 Lack of Intention 
 
In Example 5, Jack harms Jill with no ill intent – he merely “consumes materials 
that are essential for bicycle manufacturing” (436). Plausibly, the suggestion is that 
we see Jack’s duty (if it exists at all) as non-urgent because he does not intend to 
harm Jill – merely going about his business, he causes harm. Lack of intention to 
harm is present in the climate change case as well – our daily activities that 
consume greenhouse gases are not intended to cause harm. But this should not 
stop us attributing responsibility using principles of burden-sharing. As with the 
problem of time-lag, the scale of the harm that will be caused and the confidence 
with which we can trace the harm to our collective activity of creating greenhouse 
gases make the apportioning of responsibility via conventional means more apt. If 
it were made clearer in Example 5 and Example 6 that the parties knew of their 
effects on the future victims, and such effects were not denying future persons 
bicycles, but seriously endangering their lives and livelihoods, I think their duties 
to undertake the remedial tasks associated with their activities would become 
much more urgent. Lack of intention does not render climate change highly 
irregular.  
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2.3.6 Non-existent Harm? 
 
Finally, we must deal with the challenge that individuals’ single acts cause no 
harm in the case of climate change, and that this makes assigning responsibility to 
individuals difficult. We saw the claim that single acts of individuals cause no 
harm is most forcefully made by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2010), who argues 
that, because climate change is an issue of thresholds, and individual 
contributions are miniscule, individual contributions cause no harm. But that 
claim is controversial, especially if we see acts that raise the probability of great 
harm as harmful themselves. John Nolt draws an interesting analogy: 
 
Even one Sunday afternoon drive (like one cigarette) slightly increases the 
probability of harm, and the number of people and animals in the world during 
the centuries in which the emissions from the drive will persist in the atmosphere 
is (like the number of potential mutation sites in the individual strands of DNA in 
our lungs) vast (Nolt 2011: 65). 
 
Following Nolt, we could argue that an individual’s acts of emitting could easily 
be judged as harmful, if harm can be understood in a probabilistic sense. 
 
But even if it were true that the actions of individuals cause no harm, this need not 
stop us allocating responsibility to individuals in proportion to their contribution 
to the problem. For, under a contribution-based principle, it would be an 
individual’s share of the climate burden that they are asked to meet, rather than 
responsibility for the particular harm that individual caused. Perhaps it is hard to 
attribute any harm to the actions of particular individuals, but it is not hard to 
show that someone who lives a highly consumptive lifestyle contributes more to 
the overall climate burden than one living in austerity. More obviously, we need 
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not show that individuals have caused harm in order to allocate responsibility to 
them by an ability-based principle.  
 
 
2.3.7 Factors in Concert 
 
The problem of climate change involves a range of features: infinitesimal harms 
from individual contributors, temporal, geographic and political diversity among 
contributors to the climate burden, the lack of intention of the contributors and the 
fact that the harms from climate change are (mainly) in the future. We have dealt 
with each of these factors in turn and rejected the idea that they require us to take 
a revisionary approach to climate ethics. We still need to assess the idea that while 
none of these factors alone is sufficient to make sharing the climate burden non-
paradigmatic, they do so in concert. 
Here the supporter of the irregularity thesis needs to make a strong case. After all, 
if none of the special features of climate change threaten the burden-sharing 
approach, why should they somehow acquire the power to do so when 
considered together? A supporter of the irregularity argument might respond that 
generally the effect of several types of variation from the paradigm of a singular 
agent directly harming a singular victim does dilute our intuition of responsibility. 
This is why Jamieson uses Example 6 to prove his point:  
 
Example 6: acting independently, Jack and a large number of unacquainted people 
set in motion a chain of events that causes a large number of future people who 
will live in another part of the world from ever having bikes (436). 
 
Considering such an example, even if they rejected the idea that any one of the 
non-standard features we have identified significantly reduces Jack’s moral 
responsibility, many people would judge that Jack is not even partly morally 
responsible for the harm to the victims. Perhaps there is a compounding effect 
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here that stems from the combination of several unusual features. But is Example 
6 really closely analogous to climate change? If it were, we would expect other 
small-scale analogies that attempt to model the moral implications of climate 
change to also render responsibility problematic.  
 
First let us consider the disanalogies between Example 6 and the case of climate 
change. Two of them we have already seen: climate change, but not the loss of 
bicycles, will threaten lives directly, and we have more certainty about the causal 
chain that connects the eventual harm to the acts undertaken today. Consider also 
that the victims of climate change are not only in the future (see Section 1.1) and 
not only in “another part of the world” (436), since the impacts from climate 
change will be felt in almost every country.  
 
Stephen Gardiner reconstructs what I believe is a more accurate small-scale 
analogy of climate change. Imagine a group of wealthy people who collectively 
put on fireworks displays that consistently threaten people living in poorer 
neighbourhoods (Gardiner 2011) 17 . Perhaps (to reflect the time lag in climate 
change) the threat from the fireworks could be that they are of a special type that 
not only cause some damage now, but also emit harmful radiation that will affect 
fetuses in that area for years to come.18 Now few, I imagine, will be willing to say 
that the application of orthodox, anthropocentric moral responsibility to those 
putting on the fireworks displays is undermined by the multiple differences 
between the firework example and a simple example of direct, immediate harm. If 
the argument for the combined effect of the specific complications in the case of 
climate change rests on thought experiments such as Example 6, and a more 
analogous example finds much less of a combined effect, the argument suffers 
considerably. So it would be wrong to suggest that responsibility cannot cleanly 
                                                          
17The fact that Pogge and Gardiner both make use of fireworks displays in their examples 
seems to be a simple coincidence. 
18 This addition of the lag element is my own. Gardiner discusses lag separately from his 
example.  
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apply due to the specific combination of complexities in the case of climate 
change.  
 
 
2.4 TOWARDS ORTHODOXY 
 
Some of the characteristics of the climate change burden serve to make ethical 
responsibility for it not less but more orthodox. I have already mentioned that the 
precision involved in determining proportionate burdens increases the force of the 
responsibility to bear those burdens. There are two more considerations that make 
the allocation of the climate change burden more orthodox.  
 
First, climate change plausibly poses a question of the distribution of only 
burdens, rather than the more familiar question of the distribution of benefits and 
burdens of social institutions. To what extent (if at all) there should be a deliberate 
redistribution of the benefits of different parties’ economic activity is controversial, 
but apportioning responsibility for the burdens of climate change need not face 
this controversy. Climate change involves a great deal of harm, and this harm can 
be increased or decreased depending on the activity of currently alive people. If a 
state of affairs is created in which people have their basic interests jeopardised 
through climate change, this involves the type of crossing of a person’s 
boundaries that even hard-line libertarians could appreciate. What a successful set 
of distributive principles attempts to do is to apportion remedial responsibility for 
bearing the burden to ensure this harm is avoided or reduced to a morally 
acceptable level. This fact alone means that the question of distribution of burdens 
is less like the controversial question of how the fruits of society’s labours should 
be divided, and more an urgent moral question of distributing responsibility to 
remedy serious harm.  
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Second, we have been considering climate change as a distribution of 
responsibility to remedy harm, which has similarities with the allocation of legal 
liability. But this model may be somewhat misleading in the case of the 
distribution of climate burdens, because it may bring to mind cases with less sense 
of urgency than the task of the distribution of the burdens of climate change. If I 
am involved in a three-party collision destroying one party’s vehicle, there is some 
sense of urgency in apportioning the blame. But the urgency is not very strong. 
Say that the forensic work that entails apportioning responsibility takes many 
years, and yet comes up with an answer that I am at fault, and I pay compensation 
to you (that includes the opportunity cost of what you could have done with the 
capital). Here it seems that my responsibility to you is at least partially met. In 
contrast, due to the lagged nature of the climate change problem, apportioning 
burden-shares for the climate tasks is almost entirely a forward looking project. 
Any delay in apportioning burden shares does not just delay injustice; it is likely 
to directly increase it, for two reasons. First, any delay will mean many of those 
who had duties ascribed to them will pass away without discharging them, 
leaving more burdens to be divided by a secondary principle amongst those who 
otherwise would not have borne primary responsibility for the burden.19 Second, 
delay in bearing the specific burdens of adaptation and mitigation will increase the 
burden on those who are least responsible for bearing it – the victims of physical 
climate change – due to the increased harms from extreme weather and other ill 
effects of under-mitigated climate change. 
 
                                                          
19This ignores the possibility that current generations should bear none of the burden of 
climate change. No philosophers I know of defend such a view, but see Mendelsohn (2006) for 
an example of one economist’s defence of something like it.  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
To find a just allocation of the climate change burden, we need not revise our 
moral concepts. No aspect of climate change is ethically irregular in itself, even in 
just the weak sense that it is unprecedented. Perhaps climate change is unusual in 
that it combines several features that involve moral complexity into one problem. 
But this need not make the sharing of the climate burden an ethically deviant 
problem that requires a revisionary approach. Rather it just calls for more care 
when applying the principles that apportion responsibility to various parties. 
Furthermore, climate change involves some features that cause it to lie closer to 
the paradigm of an urgent, orthodox ethical challenge than other examples of 
burden-sharing do.  
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3 
 
Against Grandfathering Emissions 
Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
“The atmosphere is not a perfume, it has no taste of the distillation, it is 
odorless, it is for my mouth forever...” Walt Whitman, Song of Myself (1999 [1888]: 
Book 3, verse 2) 
 
 
3.1 THE ARGUMENT FOR GRANDFATHERING 
 
3.1.1. Grandfathering 
 
To grant greater rights to emit greenhouse gases to those parties who have emitted 
more in the past is known in the context of climate change negotiations as 
“grandfathering”.20 If such an approach were justified, it would seriously affect 
                                                          
20The etymology of the term ‘grandfathering’ is interesting. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the term is derived from the “grandfather clauses” of late 19th century southern 
states. These clauses exempted voters from the otherwise quite stringent laws that restricted 
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our assessment of the allocation of climate burdens. Most obviously, it would 
influence the emissions entitlements that parties should be granted, with past high 
emitters receiving more permits to emit than my two-track approach would 
otherwise allocate to them. Changing the pattern of emissions entitlements to 
account for high historical use could also modify how a “polluter pays” principle 
apportions parties’ shares of the other climate tasks of adaptation and 
compensation, by creating a variable baseline against which parties should be 
judged to be contributing to the problem. (That is to say, grandfathering might 
allow past high emitters a certain level of historically justified emissions before 
they are judged to be polluting and thus receive shares of the burden under 
“polluter pays”.) 
 
Grandfathering is common in the world of climate policy. It is a feature of the 
Kyoto Protocol, under which emissions entitlements for the high-emitting Annex 
One countries are expressed as a proportionate reduction from their 1990 
emissions (UNFCCC 2011a). The USA, which remains outside the Protocol, and 
Canada, which recently left it, are also asserting their right to continue emitting at 
a high level (The Guardian 2011). By merely offering pledges on a voluntary basis 
to slightly reduce their emissions compared to 1990, these two countries are 
asserting the right to continue emitting at approximately the levels set by their 
past high use. Grandfathering could also be applied to a distribution of emissions 
entitlements at the level of the firm or the individual.21 For example, under a firm-
                                                                                                                                                                               
suffrage, as long as their grandfather had possessed the right to vote. The grandfather clauses 
were intended to allow illiterate and thus potentially disenfranchised whites the vote, without 
allowing illiterate blacks the same right. See also Van Deusen (1936). 
21The Lockean argument for grandfathering we will focus on is somewhat typical of the 
climate ethics literature in that finding the correct distribution of emissions rights among 
countries is taken as the key problem. In order to reply to this argument I will follow this 
convention in this chapter, although I think that countries may well not be the appropriate 
entities to receive emissions entitlements in the first place. However, the flaws in the Lockean 
argument for grandfathering emissions rights to historically high-emitting countries are 
general; they would equally trouble Lockean arguments for grandfathering in other schemes 
where the subjects are not countries but firms or individuals.  
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based scheme, companies could be granted rights to emit based on their relative 
share of past emissions, instead of having to purchase them, as was done in the 
first phase of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change 2005). Under a personal carbon allowance scheme, again, 
individuals with a history of high emissions could be granted more entitlements 
to emit.  
 
It is important to note that this particular pattern of distribution can be argued for 
from different backgrounds. There certainly is a pragmatic argument for 
supporting an international agreement which allows past heavy emitters greater 
entitlements than the more recent emitters; it is probably true that in order to 
reach an international agreement on climate change, concessions to these 
disproportionately powerful past heavy emitters must be made. But judging that a 
prudent contract with a known bully might involve grave concessions to him is 
not the same thing as claiming he has a moral reason to demand those 
concessions. As Caney forcefully points out, the fact that grandfathering might be 
necessary for an international agreement to be formed might be a moral reason for 
those desperate for such an agreement to support a grandfathering proposal, but 
cannot be cited as a moral reason in favour of grandfathering by the heavy 
emitters themselves (Caney 2009a).  
 
Luc Bovens, a supporter of moderate grandfathering, admits that the “Realpolitik-
style concessions” of those willing to compromise with powerful forces do 
nothing to establish the correct course of action in the moral sense (Bovens 2011: 
143)22. Bovens instead tries to defend moderate grandfathering on moral grounds. 
His reasoning is that there is some force to the claim that historically high emitters 
have harmlessly appropriated some of a common resource at an early stage, 
before the limits to the atmosphere’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases safely was 
threatened. Because this argument for grandfathering builds on John Locke’s 
                                                          
22This work will subsequently be referred to simply by page number in this chapter. 
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account of just appropriation of commonly held resources (Locke 1956 [1689]), one 
might suspect the argument would only appeal to those who are convinced of that 
account’s correctness. But Bovens defence of grandfathering is heavily qualified. 
His argument is merely that there is “some appeal” to the Lockean story about the 
conditions under which resources that are held in common can be privately 
appropriated (129). By contrast, Bovens also recognises an “external critique”, 
noting that other considerations than Lockean property rights, such as 
sufficentarian, egalitarian or utilitarian concerns, might be relevant to determining 
the fair holdings of resources today (136). His practical conclusion is modest: 
grandfathered entitlements provide a “starting point” that should guide our 
thinking in the distribution of emissions entitlements (142). Yet, although we 
should “move away” from the starting point of grandfathering with “haste and 
determination” (142), Bovens ultimately claims that we should assign “initially 
unashamedly unequal emissions rights” (144) to historically high emitters, rights 
which are based on a “moral ground” – the on-going (if limited) recognition of 
rights gained in an earlier period (134). 23  
 
Modest as it is, it is nonetheless a moral defence of grandfathering. And as such, it 
stands against the tide in climate ethics. Philosophical discussions of emissions 
entitlements usually focus on such proposals as the equal per capita approach, 
and question whether this scheme, already much harder on historical heavy 
emitters than the status quo, still would grant over-generous entitlements to 
                                                          
23One weakness of Bovens’ argument as he presents it is that it assumes our options for 
distributing emissions entitlements as roughly two: grandfathering to some extent, or an 
equal shares approach where the rights to emit are divided equally among the parties. This 
obscures the fact that a more sophisticated proposal for dividing emissions entitlements, such 
as the auction-and-dividend approach we will investigate in Chapter Four, might be more 
plausible than either grandfathering or equal shares. Of course, a grandfathering aspect could 
be brought into auction-and-dividend, but to determine whether it should, we are still no 
longer adjudicating between a simple egalitarian division and one that incorporates 
grandfathering. Thus, Bovens’ reliance on the grandfathering/equal shares dichotomy might 
make his case seem stronger than it is, and I will try to represent Bovens argument as best I 
can without this dichotomy. 
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historical high emitters (D. Miller 2008; Neumayer 2000; Singer 2004). Some also 
wonder if the equal per-capita approach protects the historically low-emitting 
global poor enough (Caney 2009a; Gosseries 2005; R. Miller 2010; Shue 1993). 
Simon Caney is perhaps the most vocal in rejecting grandfathering, claiming that 
it “rewards people in accordance with their contribution to the creation of a 
problem”, a characteristic which is “clearly perverse”(Caney 2011: 88). Bovens’ 
argument is both nuanced and controversial, and it will be worth investigating it 
in some detail.  
 
 
3.1.2 Bovens’ Argument.  
 
The Lockean paradigm of just acquisition of land is represented by Bovens in a 
vignette I will refer to as Homesteading: 24  
 
Let there be a commons that is genuinely unmanaged and unproductive. Some 
people decide to fence in part of the commons to work the land. Suppose that 
every such act of homesteading is such that some are better off and nobody is 
worse off, where such welfare evaluations are understood in terms of reasonable 
preferences. This is the Lockean enough-and-as-good condition which Nozick 
dubs “the Lockean proviso”. Now some may decide to homestead larger plots, 
some smaller plots, all dependent on their needs and aspirations in life. Some 
people may choose not to homestead, since they would not derive any joy from 
such enterprise and they prefer to work for wages by selling their labor to 
homesteaders. But nobody is allowed to homestead a plot of land that is larger 
than what he or she can reasonably put to good use. That is the Lockean no-waste 
condition. Let us suppose that this homesteading constrained by both Lockean 
                                                          
24Bovens does refer to Homesteading as a ‘popularised’ version of the Lockean account of just 
appropriation. (129). Yet he gives no clearer exposition of just what the “right-libertarian 
intuition for property rights in land” (129) actually consists of. In what follows, I will take 
Bovens’ presentation of Homesteading to function as a paradigm case illustrating how rights to 
resources could be gained in a Lockean way.  
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conditions goes on for a while. At some point it becomes clear that further 
homesteading would no longer satisfy the enough-and-as-good condition. The 
practice of homesteading is then stopped. The outcome of this process is that some 
people own smaller plots of land, some own larger plots of land and some own no 
land whatsoever. But this does not make the procedure of allocating land or the 
resulting allocation unfair (128). 
 
The next step of Bovens’ argument involves extending the Lockean story about 
land to another commonly held resource: the ability of the Earth’s atmosphere to 
absorb greenhouse gases without serious harm. The aptness of the application of 
the Lockean account to the atmosphere and the possible annulment of rights when 
the recognition of the violation of the Lockean proviso is delayed will concern us 
in Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 respectively. 
 
 
3.1.3 Lockean Emissions Rights? 
 
The atmosphere’s ability to absorb anthropogenic greenhouse gases without 
causing unacceptable climate change, we have learnt in the last few decades, can 
be seen as an important resource. (For ease of expression, I will call this resource 
the “atmospheric sink”). Plausibly, the atmospheric sink was (at least at one point 
in time) a resource in the global commons, much like land once was, in 
Homesteading, a resource in a nascent society's commons.  
 
Bovens’ Lockean account of the fair appropriation of the atmospheric sink is this: 
at one time in the past, use of the atmospheric sink did not violate the Lockean 
proviso; when the first “little puff of GHGs [greenhouse gases]” was emitted from 
“the first steam engine in England” the commons was still able to be used without 
making anyone worse off (132). Bovens says very little about the no-waste 
condition besides noting that it was not violated. Presumably though, we should 
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judge that the vast resource that was the atmosphere’s ability to absorb 
greenhouse gases safely was not being squandered in these early days, but used to 
benefit people through the greatly increased opportunities for transport, heating, 
electricity generation and manufacturing goods.  
 
While the Lockean proviso was not violated until some time after the first 
industrial use of the atmospheric sink, Bovens rightly recognises that it must have 
been violated much earlier than the time at which we discovered that continual 
greenhouse gas emissions would seriously harm future people. We can identify an 
early period, before the Lockean proviso was violated; and an interim period, 
during which parties “illicitly” appropriated the atmospheric sink without 
knowing they were violating the Lockean Proviso (133). Now we are in a late 
period, which may have begun somewhere between 1970 and 199025, in which our 
recognition of the limits of the atmospheric sink means we can see that further 
appropriations violate the Lockean proviso. Again, all that is needed to motivate 
moderate grandfathering is that at least some rights to the atmospheric sink were 
gained during the early period. It is those legitimate appropriations that could 
form the basis of the limited claim for heavy emitters to a greater use of the 
atmospheric sink now.  
 
 
 3.1.4 Conditions for Annulment 
 
The lag between the Lockean proviso being violated and our knowledge that it 
has been violated raises a problem for those supportive of Lockean rights. During 
the interim period, when we did not know the proviso was being violated, 
massive amounts of greenhouse gases were added to the atmosphere, meaning 
that rights to the moderate flows of emissions that would have legitimately passed 
                                                          
25I will explore the issue of what was known when about harmful climate change in Chapter 
Four. 
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the Lockean proviso in the early period can no longer do so now. In such a case 
where the correct stopping point for appropriation has been overshot, what 
should happen to the rights gained legitimately before the Lockean proviso was 
violated?  
 
Bovens does not think the legitimacy of property rights depends on the 
consequent distribution of resources continually satisfying the Lockean proviso, 
and this is a plausible enough view. 26  However, he does see the continuing 
legitimacy of rights that were gained in an early period of appropriation as 
contingent on the holders of those rights satisfying at least one of the two Lockean 
conditions. If such a test fails, Bovens claims, we can make an “internal critique” 
of the Lockean approach, so called because the rights gained through 
appropriation can be challenged with reference to the same conditions that 
justified the rights in the first place.  
 
To explain how, he introduces a thought experiment adapted from Robert Nozick 
that he calls Nozick’s Well.  
 
Suppose that a number of people have drilled wells (or, in Nozick’s terms, water 
holes). The enough-and-as-good condition was satisfied; they have appropriated 
these wells and are selling the water in a competitive market. (Nozick does not 
include Locke’s no-waste condition.) Now conditions change and all wells run dry 
except for one. The owner of this well now has a monopoly position and can 
extract monopoly prices. Nozick suggests that this might be permissible if the 
situation came about due to this person’s good stewardship (and, presumably, the 
                                                          
26In support of this, Bovens gives the example of an orchardist appropriating a piece of waste 
land that was “an eyesore to the neighbouring community” (137). At the time, no-one lost out 
from the orchardist’s acquisition, so the Lockean proviso was not violated. But once the 
orchard has been established, the community might well benefit if the orchard was returned 
to them. There is no longer “enough and as good” of the newly improved land to go around. 
Bovens asserts that even if continued private possession of the orchard does violate the 
Lockean proviso, to judge that it should therefore be reclaimed by the public seems wrong.  
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poor stewardship of others) rather than just luck. But it is not permissible if it 
came about due to desertification and the simple good luck that this person owns 
a well in the only location where there is still water to be tapped. (137)  
 
Bovens posits that, while continued ownership does not require strict ongoing 
applications of the original Lockean conditions, massive violations can annul 
property rights. But he also notes that the situation is somewhat more 
complicated, as considering Nozick’s Well suggests that we should see an 
interaction between the two conditions. Once the Lockean proviso is 
comprehensively violated, a small violation of the no-waste condition is enough to 
annul previously held property rights. Likewise, once the no-waste condition is 
comprehensively violated, a minor violation of the Lockean proviso also would 
annul such rights. For example, in a situation where housing is very scarce, 
leaving a building unoccupied for even a short period of time may justify 
squatters taking possession of it, or at least gaining use rights over it. Likewise, a 
very small benefit to others (such as being able to save a minute by crossing 
someone’s land) might be enough to over-ride property rights and create a right-
of-way when land has been unoccupied – and thus wasted - for a significant 
period of time. The interaction between the two conditions can also have the effect 
of maintaining private property rights: extraordinary stewardship can count for 
the preservation of some property rights even when the Lockean Proviso is 
strongly violated, as Bovens suggests would be the case with the prudent owner 
in Nozick’s well. Returning to the atmospheric sink, the point Bovens emphasises is 
that, even though the Lockean proviso is now comprehensively violated, the no-
waste condition has been (relatively speaking) respected by historical heavy 
emitters. This means the Lockean claim of historical heavy emitters to more of the 
atmospheric sink should bear some weight, and count against an immediate 
redistribution of emissions entitlements.  
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Bovens defends this claim of good stewardship of the atmospheric sink by 
emphasising the poor stewardship of developing countries. The developed world, 
admittedly, has used the atmospheric sink for luxuries as well as necessities, but 
the developing world has not been a good steward of their portion of the 
atmospheric sink, holding a “poor performance in GHG emissions per unit of 
GDP” (143). Relatively speaking then, developed countries have not violated the 
no-waste condition, meaning that their past appropriation of a common resource 
still provides a reason why some of the differences in emissions that exist between 
developed and developing countries should remain.  
 
According to Bovens, if we do not think that appropriation of common land that 
hurt no-one was unjust, we have a reason to support the property rights in the 
atmospheric sink gained before the Lockean proviso. Although there are good 
reasons to now reduce the gap in emissions between developed and developing 
countries, there are also moral reasons, especially from a sophisticated Lockean 
perspective, to respect the patterns of use that create this gap, in the same way 
that we might respect historically-generated property rights in other domains. The 
fair distribution of climate change burdens involves a “balancing” (143) of reasons 
for and against grandfathering, with the result being moderate grandfathering.  
 
This ends my exposition of Bovens’ argument. In the next section, I will first 
present general worries from several perspectives about the move from accepting 
Lockean rights in the case of land to affirming that such rights exist in the case of 
the atmospheric sink. Finally I will put these worries aside, and show that, even if 
we grant that Lockean approaches could make sense in the case of the 
atmosphere, the very caveats that Bovens recognises should apply in cases of post-
appropriation violation of the Lockean proviso undermine the case for moderate 
grandfathering.  
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3.2 CHALLENGING THE LOCKEAN APPROACH  
 
3.2.1 A Worry from Climate Scientists 
 
One complaint which is worth considering is that Bovens is wrong to treat the 
atmospheric sink as a resource system like land that can provide a constant 
service. Since CO2, the most important greenhouse gas, has a complex lifetime 
(some CO2 emitted now will persist in the atmosphere for centuries) the total 
amount of CO2 that can be emitted in the next few centuries without causing 
dangerous climate change is finite. One might say that the world has a ‘global 
carbon budget’ of a trillion, or maybe 750 billion tonnes of carbon, after which our 
emissions should cease completely (Shue 2011; Allen et al. 2009). The atmospheric 
sink, for CO2 at least, is now a depletable resource, not a productive system - more 
like rations on a lifeboat than like commonly held land - and this alone is enough 
to undermine the analogy with Homesteading.  
 
Likewise, Lockean approaches could equally apply to finite resources. I might be 
justified in claiming sand from a beach, not because the amount I claim will be 
replenished quickly, but because I leave such a vast amount there that no-one can 
complain there is not enough left for them. Bovens’ argument for grandfathering 
emissions rights could still hold even if the rights that are to be now distributed 
are not rights to continue to use a natural service at a given level, but entitlements 
to consume an unequal share of a finite resource. 
  
In any case, there is good reason to believe that around the time of the industrial 
revolution, when Bovens’ Lockean rights were being gained, the atmosphere was 
still a resource system with the potential to provide a constant service of 
absorption of CO2 (as it still does in the case of short-lived greenhouse gases). As 
long as CO2 has a finite lifetime (even if this is long and complex) there is some 
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amount of CO2 that can be emitted continuously without the net effects on anyone 
being negative. Admittedly, since this amount must not make others worse off, 
taking into account the persistence of CO2, it will be quite a low amount. 
Recognising the long lifetime of CO2 shortens the ‘early’ period of acquisition, 
pushing back in time the moment at which early industrialists violated the 
Lockean proviso, but it does not undermine the analogy with Homesteading. The 
atmospheric sink was once a resource system that provided a steady flow of a 
good available for use, just as land does in Homesteading.  
 
In the rest of Section 3.2 I will suggest that we should be concerned by the 
application of the Lockean framework to the atmospheric sink because the 
features that ground Homesteading’s appeal may not be present in the case of the 
atmospheric sink. Unpacking the appeal of Homesteading is deep and difficult 
territory, however, and what follows can only be a sketch of some concerns. Those 
unconvinced by such a sketch will find more reasons to deny grandfathering in 
Section 3.3. 
 
 
3.2.2 Worries from Contractarians and Welfarists 
 
Despite having an essential Lockean element, Bovens tries to make his argument 
ecumenical by not requiring us to be committed Lockeans about property rights, 
but only to accept that there is something appealing about the Lockean story he 
tells in Homesteading. This appeal can then be balanced against what he calls the 
“external critique” of his Lockean view of appropriation – the critique that 
broadly welfare-based considerations matter more than rights gained through 
historic use.  
So the background to Bovens’ argument for moderate grandfathering seems to be 
a kind of ethical pluralism, in which concern for historically generated rights and 
concern for the welfare of current people provide competing reasons for action - 
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competing reasons that require balancing. Yet it should be obvious that such 
pluralism need not be the only framework by which we view the apparent conflict 
between our intuitions about Homesteading on the one hand and our commitment 
to the concerns of the external critique on the other.  
 
One possibility is that, instead of Lockean rights providing reasons which support 
private property by themselves, they instead only gain their power from a tacit 
contract between relevant parties at the time. It is interesting that in Bovens’ 
presentation of Homesteading, people “choose” not to homestead and “prefer” to 
work for wages, which could be prompting our intuitions about the importance of 
a tacit acceptance of a bargain or contract.  
 
Alternatively, it could be that any appeal we see in the story of Homesteading arises 
just because we recognise that granting of rights on historical grounds is 
instrumentally valuable to the promotion of those broader welfare-based or other 
humanitarian concerns that Bovens sees as fundamentally opposing the Lockean 
allocation. For instance, we might only commend the pattern of property 
allocation in Homesteading because human welfare is best served by 
accommodating our particular psychological biases towards having domain over 
the tangible parts of the common land we have become involved with, where this 
doesn’t obviously harm others. Or we could commend it because endorsing a 
general programme of quasi-Lockean land rights is the best way to promote the 
most efficient use of the resources (because in granting continued property rights 
we encourage good stewardship, investment and prudence (Hardin 1968), and 
first use is as good a criterion as any by which to allocate such rights).  
 
These accounts shows that it is possible for us to be quasi-Lockean, fully affirming 
that past appropriation of land gives rise to rights (subject to the Lockean proviso) 
but only because of deeper considerations of the importance of welfare or tacit 
contracts. But the question of grandfathering concerns the just allocation of rights 
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to a type of resource we have only just discovered - the atmospheric sink. From 
the contractarian and welfare-centred points of view we have been considering, it 
may be desirable to allocate rights to this resource by some quite different 
principle from that by which we allocate land. The goals of satisfying 
psychological needs for territory and promoting efficient use do not seem to 
translate easily to the atmospheric sink. If we have a deep need to stake out parts 
of the atmosphere, it’s essentially non-excludable nature means this need should 
probably be curbed, rather than indulged. As for efficiency, granting greater rights 
to the atmospheric sink to those who have used more of it seems to reward 
inefficiency rather than efficiency. We will return to the latter point in Section 3.3  
27. As for the contractarian position, the idea of even a tacit contract being formed 
between early major and minor emitters while they were so ignorant of the nature 
of the resource they had been using is bizarre. 
 
If we were to judge that the Lockean allocation pattern we found appealing in 
Homesteading was fundamentally grounded in deeper considerations of welfare or 
a social contract, Bovens’ argument for grandfathering emissions rights would be 
unconvincing. In the case of the atmospheric sink those considerations either 
count against grandfathering or cannot apply to it, so there would seem to be no 
reason to grant any weight to the historical appropriation of the sink.  
 
 
 
                                                          
27One welfare-based pragmatic argument for grandfathering might be that heavy historical 
emitters should be allowed more emissions entitlements because such parties are so 
dependent on high emissions industries that restricting their emissions would be devastating. 
This is easily met, though: it seems fair to allow some kind of trading of emissions rights in 
order to allow those privileged yet highly dependent on greenhouse gas emissions to 
legitimately purchase surplus entitlements from those less developed nations that will not use 
their full entitlement (Page, 2011b, Caney and Hepburn 2011). Allowing the developed 
nations to have more entitlement to emit once they have paid for such rights in no way 
justifies giving heavy emitters more emissions rights to begin with. 
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3.2.3 Worries for Pluralists and Libertarians 
 
Of course, those who subscribe to libertarianism will see instrumental 
justifications of the kinds of rights gained in the appropriation of common land as 
missing the point. Some pluralists also might see Lockean rights as providing 
reasons in themselves to respect property. For both groups, the attractiveness of 
Lockean rights in Homesteading is genuine: the account illustrates a way in which 
individuals can actually gain rights over land through their activity on it. These 
views face a different worry: that the likely accounts of how people gain rights 
over the land in Homesteading are either too wide in their scope to be plausible 
generally, or too narrow to apply to the atmospheric sink.  
 
Perhaps it is that individuals simply had some effect on land in Homesteading, 
without necessarily intending to, that gives them title to it. But this seems wrong. 
For it is surely not the case that we have ongoing claim to every part of nature's 
services that we have some effect on, subject to the Lockean conditions. If we did 
allow rights to be claimed simply by the habitual, unintentional affecting of any 
dimension of the world that does not presently leave others worse off or involve 
significant waste, rights of this kind would have a scope so wide as to be absurd. I 
might now be gaining ongoing rights to the ability of the Earth’s crust to support 
my weight, the ability of the atmosphere to absorb the heat from my computer, 
and so on ad absurdum. We should be very wary of such a proliferation of rights.  
 
The other alternative, that one condition of gaining Lockean rights is that one does 
intend to work the particular resource one gains title over, also seems to run into 
difficulty in the context of climate change. The homesteaders in Bovens’ story 
certainly intended to interact with the land, but it would be controversial to say 
that early industrialists intended to use the atmospheric sink; they had no idea it 
existed, or at best, considered it to be limitless. It is far from clear that we intend to 
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use unknown resources, or resources we judge to be practically limitless like the 
ability of the Earth’s crust to support our bodyweight.  
 
That said, the philosophy of intention is complex, and a sophisticated Lockean 
account might be able to respond to such worries. Equally, an argument for 
moderate grandfathering in the case of the atmosphere might be able to proceed 
on contractarian or welfare-based grounds. But more work needs to be done for 
the Lockean approach to answer the worries above.  
 
However, in the remainder of this chapter I shall assess Bovens’ defence of 
moderate grandfathering assuming, for the sake of argument, that an application 
of the Lockean account to the appropriation of the atmospheric sink is apt. In 
doing so, it seems that the caveats that Bovens himself suggests for when property 
rights in general should be annulled (the “internal critique”) still lead us away 
from even moderate grandfathering.  
 
 
3.3 THE INTERNAL CRITIQUE RECONSIDERED.  
 
Recall that the internal critique revolved around the interaction of two 
considerations. When there are serious violations of the Lockean proviso, only 
good stewardship (i.e. respecting the no-waste condition) can prevent previously 
obtained rights being annulled. Likewise, when persons are wasting a resource, 
even a minor violation of the Lockean proviso could be enough to remove 
historically acquired rights. But, according to Bovens, “[i]f the no-waste condition 
is strongly respected, then the violation of the enough-and-as-good condition by 
itself is not enough to revoke my property rights” (140). In the case of climate 
change, Bovens believes, the no-waste condition has been respected by historical 
high emitters: their “good stewardship” (142) prevents their violation of the 
Lockean proviso removing the rights they had gained in the early period. The 
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whole case for moderate grandfathering of emissions entitlements therefore rests 
on the strength of the claim that some (or perhaps most) historic emitters have 
been good stewards.  
 
Bovens’ only defence of this claim of good stewardship is to point out that 
developed countries and developing countries have both wasted the service of the 
atmospheric sink: the developed world through “inefficient and frivolous 
consumption”, the developing world through “the use of dirty industries and 
hence its poor performance in GHG emissions per unit of GDP” (143). But even if 
Bovens’ claim about the developing world wasting the atmospheric sink is true, it 
is insufficient to justify even limited grandfathering. Remember from Nozick’s well 
that a serious violation of the enough-and-as-good condition was sufficient to 
justify the redistribution of water unless good stewardship has been shown. All 
that Bovens has done is claim that developed countries have been at least as bad 
stewards of the atmospheric sink as developing countries have been. But by 
Bovens’ own theory developed countries need to have done better than that. As it 
stands, according to Bovens, all have violated both the Lockean proviso and the 
no-waste condition, so none of the parties are entitled to the atmospheric sink by 
dint of historic appropriation.  
 
Could we go further than Bovens, and claim that the developing world’s “use of 
dirty industries and hence its poor performance in GHG emissions per unit of 
GDP” (143) shows worse stewardship than the developed world’s love affair with 
SUVs and long-chaul flights? I doubt it. First it is a gross oversimplification to say 
that the developing world has a poor performance in greenhouse gas emissions 
per unit of GDP. It is true that India and China have some of the highest of these 
figures, but countries such as Mozambique, Gabon and Zambia are among the 
twenty cleanest countries when CO2 emissions from fossil fuel consumption are 
measured per unit of GDP (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2011: 94). 
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If we compare CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion with GDP measured by 
purchasing power parity,28 there is even less support for Bovens’ claims about 
waste. 43 of the cleanest 50 countries on this metric are developing countries. 
Heavy past emitters tend to rank poorly. An EU average would come 61st, USA 
comes 97th, and Australia 109th out of 141 major countries (IEA 2011: 94).29  
 
But there is a deeper problem: reaping more economic benefits from a resource 
simply does not represent good stewardship. It is true that getting more benefits 
from a given amount of pollution is a valuable goal, but this fact is orthogonal to 
our purposes here, which is to determine the degree to which different parties 
have violated the no-waste condition.  
 
The idea that good stewardship involves getting the most economic value out of 
the resource or service one has appropriated is odd, and its strangeness can be 
seen when we translate it to other cases. Take the case of commercial fisheries, for 
instance, which Bovens believes is another common resource in which historical 
rights are (and should be) respected.30 The value that one extracts from fish, once 
it is harvested, is not really relevant to stewardship per se. Whether I choose to sell 
my fish at a good price or give it away is irrelevant to whether or not I have been a 
good steward of my quota (or the fish stocks generally). Likewise with land. 
                                                          
28 Purchasing power parity seems to be a better measurement of efficient use here, for it is not 
the nominal value of benefits gained, but their actual value that matters.  
29 Interestingly, if a low ratio of tangible benefits per unit of greenhouse gas emitted indicates 
wastage of the atmospheric sink, this would, on the face of it, undermine Bovens’ assumption 
that early emitters did not violate the no-waste condition. For they used vastly dirtier 
technologies than the coal power plants of India and China today, such as coal fired steam 
engines, that would take much more of the atmospheric sink to deliver the same tangible 
results as the dirtiest technology would today. Perhaps some relative measure of waste could 
be used to excuse early emitters, but in that case, one might suggest that developing countries, 
due to their differing circumstances, be given the same kind of leniency, and judged better 
stewards than developed countries. 
30Bovens cites EU fisheries policy in this respect, which grants quotas to countries on the basis 
of their relative past use of the resource. In New Zealand waters, rights are distributed to 
firms in a similar way.  
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Whether a homesteader in Homesteading invests their agricultural surplus well and 
becomes rich or spends it frivolously and continues to toil by the sweat of their 
brow seems to be irrelevant to whether or not they satisfy the no-waste condition.  
 
We should reject the ratio of economic benefits to emissions level as a metric of 
stewardship.31 We need to investigate more deeply what stewardship might mean. 
To do so, let us consider the measures of stewardship in Bovens’ own examples. 
There are two main threads. In Homesteading and his general discussion of 
property rights in land and buildings the key criterion was that appropriators be 
“capable of working or willing to work or manage” the land or space that the 
agents enclose (138). Appropriators must be ready to capture the flow they get 
from their portion of the resource system – their land. By this criterion, all 
countries would have been good stewards of the atmospheric sink, since all 
countries have used the flows from their initial appropriation of the atmospheric 
sink during the early phase (and much more). But to apply the no-waste condition 
in this way to the atmospheric sink is laughable. If good stewardship means 
anything here, it means not using the flows from the stock you have previously 
appropriated.  
 
How is the no-waste or stewardship condition meant to be interpreted in the case 
of Nozick’s Well? Here, according to Bovens, it means something quite different. 
Two main ways wells could survive, let us say, are either by restrictions on their 
use, or by improving the system in other ways (covering them so water does not 
evaporate).32 But historic high emitters have done none of these things. They have 
not rationed the use of the atmospheric sink. As to improvement, the minor 
                                                          
 
32Why would Bovens interpret the no-waste condition so differently between Homesteading 
and Nozick’s Well? Perhaps because land is excludable in a special way. Once you have 
annexed common land, and excluded others from investing in it, it seems plausible to ask that 
you use it in order to maintain your claim to it. But it is impossible to exclude others from the 
atmospheric sink, and so claiming more than one can use is not physically possible, so 
stewardship must mean something different here.  
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improvements some may have made to the atmospheric ability to absorb 
greenhouse gases through afforestation have been swamped by their rapacious 
use of it in terms of emissions. Even when one includes carbon captured by their 
20th century increase in forest cover, Annex 1 countries (roughly the group of 
heavy historical emitters) have taken roughly 70% of the total portion of the 
atmospheric sink claimed by people since 1750, despite forming just a small 
fraction of the world’s population (Dellink and Den Elzen 2009).  
 
Overall, when we examine the distribution of emissions entitlements using 
Bovens’ own theory of what justifies respecting Lockean rights post condition-
violation, it seems that developed countries have been poor stewards of the 
atmospheric sink. Given they also would violate the Lockean proviso by 
continuing to use the atmospheric sink at previous levels, any historically-based 
claim they might have had to the atmospheric sink should be annulled.  
 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Bovens provides us with a unique, Lockean attempt at justifying what has been, 
and will probably continue to be, political reality: those who have used the 
atmosphere’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases the most in the past are given the 
most entitlements to continue to use it. However appealing the Lockean 
framework is for land, I think there are significant worries about applying it to the 
atmospheric sink. But even if one thinks that the Lockean story about 
appropriation could be applied in principle to the atmospheric sink, it should not 
lead us to support grandfathering. Bovens own plausible emphasis on the 
importance of owners continually satisfying at least one of the conditions of 
appropriation undermines the claim of the developed world to their high level of 
emissions. They have neither left as much and as good for others nor been good 
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stewards. Bovens’ argument fails, and we must measure entitlements to emit, and 
contributions to the problem of global warming, without reference to rights 
supposedly gained through historical patterns of emissions. 
 
At the political level, the failure of Bovens’ attempt to justify grandfathering on 
moral grounds is of great importance. As mentioned before, there have been few if 
any scholarly attempts to justify grandfathering morally, yet it is a concept that 
remains at the heart of international climate policy. The Kyoto protocol embodies 
a kind of grandfathering, and those historic heavy emitters who refuse to sign it or 
pull out to accept only relatively lenient voluntary targets to reduce emissions 
seem to be claiming to have a right to continue emitting at higher levels than other 
countries, with no moral justification. Grandfathering will still shape domestic 
climate change policy as well. In the emissions trading schemes such as those of 
New Zealand and the EU, many firms with historical high emissions are granted 
their allocations of emissions entitlements for free (Climate Change Information 
New Zealand 2011; European Comission 2008). Presumably because of the 
influence that heavy emitters hold, grandfathering emissions rights is seen as an 
acceptable practice. In the political world, past emissions are seen to justify, rather 
than undermine claims for disproportionately high emissions now. As a new legal 
agreement on climate change to replace the Kyoto Protocol is negotiated over the 
coming decade, it will be interesting to see if any moral case could be made to 
justify such a practice. If not, and if the new agreement allows current emissions 
to be significantly determined by past emissions, it would be another deeply 
regrettable case of injustice in international affairs.  
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4 
 
The Two-Track Theory and its 
Application 
 
 
 
“It appears that we must settle for a pluralist approach to distributing 
responsibilities.” David Miller (2001: 468) 
 
“Climate change is a very unusual ethical challenge because it's so completely 
measurable” - George Marshall (cited in Harding 2011: para. 102) 
 
 
4.1 THEORY 
 
 
4.1.1 Principles of Justice 
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In Chapter Two we recognised that principles of burden-sharing are needed to 
help decide who is responsible for remedying the harms due to climate change. In 
Chapter Three we rejected the principle that initial use of the atmospheric sink 
provides a reason to grant historical heavy emitters more rights to emit now. We 
still face the morally urgent tasks that make up the climate burden: tasks of 
mitigation, adaptation and compensation. Therefore, we need to find acceptable 
principles of justice in this domain, to guide us in choosing who should bear how 
much of the overall climate burden. In this chapter I develop a two-principle 
theory for allocating climate burdens, inspired by Simon Caney (2005, 2010)33. I 
divide the burden of climate change into the part that should be allocated by a 
plausible “polluter pays” principle (the “fault burden”) and the part which should 
not (the “no-fault burden”).34. The no-fault burden is that part caused by the 
emissions created by the very poor and the emissions created under conditions of 
excusable ignorance. I defend the claim that a date in the range of 1970 to 1990 
will best demarcate the end of conditions of excusable ignorance and I sketch the 
relative sizes of the two parts of the climate burden. Finally I develop an “ability 
to pay” principle and briefly discuss the practical import of my two-track theory.  
 
 
                                                          
33 My two-track theory follows Caney’s in its basic structure, with the division of the burden 
into two parts, and the use of a poverty sensitive “polluter pays” principle and an “ability to 
pay” principle to allocate the fault and no-fault parts respectively. It differs from Caney’s in its 
recognition that emissions produced under ignorance should not form part of the fault 
burden, its rationale for the poverty sensitive clause of the “polluter pays” principle, and its 
assertion that the “ability to pay” principle does not need to be justified by the fact that those 
able to pay have benefitted from climate change. These differences will be explained more 
fully in what follows.  
34The “fault” and “no-fault” labels play a similar role in work by Shue (1993), but I do not rely 
on his analysis. Caney refers to the burden from emissions that cannot be assigned by a 
“polluter pays” principle as “the remainder” (2010: 213ff). Such terminology suggests that this 
portion of the total climate change burden is rather minor. As we will see, burdens from such 
emissions are plausibly of the same magnitude as the burdens that can be allocated by a 
“polluter pays” principle. Calling them fault and no-fault makes no assumptions about the 
importance or magnitude of either set of burdens.  
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4.1.2 Polluter Pays 
 
Here is a principle for allocating the climate burden: 
 
Polluter Pays: Parties should bear the climate burden in proportion to their 
contribution to its cause.  
 
As stated, this principle is vague. It is unclear, for instance whether an individual 
has contributed to the cause of climate change if her emissions were low enough 
to be sustainable had all others kept to such a level. Partly because of the 
difficulties in defining what a sustainable level is (or might have been), and partly 
because others actually have not kept to a sustainable level, I will treat all current 
emissions as contributions under the “polluter pays” principle.35  
 
Polluter Pays (Total) - (PPT): Parties should bear the climate burden in proportion 
to their contribution to its cause, where contribution is measured by the total 
amount of greenhouse gas emissions created by that party.  
 
Why should we accept PPT or something like it? First, it matches the intuitions we 
have about small-scale examples: we hold a litterer, not someone else, responsible 
for rubbish she leaves in the street. This intuitive appeal may be grounded by the 
general idea that morality requires holding people accountable for the effects of 
their actions (Caney 2009c: 177). Second, reference to the “polluter pays” principle 
already features strongly in the political domain, having been recommended by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
                                                          
35Additionally, if we reject the notion that emissions should be allocated on an equal per 
capita basis (see section 4.2.2), much of the motivation for defining pollution as that over a 
sustainable level is lost.  
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European Union (EU), and the Commission on Global Governance (Comission on 
Global Governance 1995: 212; EU 2004; OECD 1974: 12-13, 18-19). Third, a 
“polluter pays” principle penalises and thus aims to deter people from performing 
the activity we wish to reduce (polluting) without directly deterring them from 
other possibly valuable activities. Finally the “polluter pays” idea provides firm 
ground on which to answer the challenge we investigated in Chapter Two, that 
climate ethics must be revisionary. By linking responsibility for harm directly to 
the performers of harmful action we remain in the familiar ethical realm of 
harmers and the harmed.  
 
 
4.1.3 Historical Emissions and Excusable Ignorance  
 
The “polluter pays“ principle appears well suited to distribute the burdens from 
current emissions. If a firm is burning large amounts of coal today, it makes sense 
to attach the responsibility of dealing with the climate burden created by the coal-
burning to that firm. But the burdens of climate change arise from historical as 
well as current emissions. The huge quantity of greenhouse gases emitted 
between the beginning of the industrial revolution and the present is the main 
cause of the changes in climate occurring now, and will be the cause of the 
changes to come.36  
 
Many have argued that the parties who created such historical emissions should 
bear responsibility for their effects. One example is the following statement by 41 
developing countries to the UN general assembly: 
 
                                                          
36 Scientific evidence suggests that around 50% of the CO2 emitted a century ago is still in the 
atmosphere, contributing to global warming now. 20% of any CO2 that has been emitted will 
persist in the atmosphere for millennia. See Meehl et al (2007: 824). Furthermore, even once 
CO2 has dissipated, much of the warming it produced remains in the climate system. For 
these reasons, we should treat historical emissions seriously.  
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Responsibility for the emissions of greenhouse gases should be viewed both in 
historical and cumulative terms, and in terms of current emissions. On the basis of 
the concept of equity, those developed countries who have contaminated most 
must contribute more" (Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development 
1991: 4 (section II.12) [italics mine]). 
 
In the lead-up to the creation of the Kyoto Protocol, Brazil formally suggested that 
countries should face emissions restrictions in proportion to their historical 
emissions since 1840 (Brazilian Delegation to the UNFCCC 1997). This stands in 
strong contrast to the Protocol that was eventually adopted, under which 
historical emissions before 1990 do not count against the quotas of countries 
today.37  
 
Developing countries have continued to stress the importance of historical 
emissions. Take, for example, the following statement from Pablo Solon, Bolivia’s 
ambassador to the UN.  
 
[Industrialised countries] have used up two thirds of the atmospheric space, 
depriving us of the necessary space for our development and provoking a climate 
crisis of huge proportions. It is entirely unjustifiable that countries like Bolivia are 
now forced to pay for the crisis. This creates a huge draw on our limited resources 
to protect our people from a crisis created by the rich and their over-consumption 
(quoted in Buxton 2009: para 3-4). 
 
Although distributing these historical burdens according to a polluter pays 
principle is a popular idea, it has problems. Many of the individuals and 
collectives that emitted heavily in the past no longer exist.38 Granted, most of the 
                                                          
37Arguably, an acknowledgement of historical responsibility may still be behind the Kyoto 
Protocol’s division between Annex 1 countries (who are assigned burdens) and non-Annex 1 
countries (who are assigned none).  
38 Recall from Chapter One the main types of actors that could be judged capable of 
possessing duties regarding climate change: states, firms, institutions and individuals. 
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historical heavy emitting states such as the UK, the USA and Germany still exist, 
but the notion that current individuals should be liable for the responsibilities 
generated by their forebears is controversial. 39  Fortunately, we can avoid this 
controversy, for we should not assign responsibility via a “polluter pays” 
principle for those emissions created before scientists suspected anthropogenic 
global warming was possible.  
 
Call this the “excusable ignorance” defence of historical emitters. The fact that an 
agent had no way of being aware of the harmful effects of her action provides a 
good reason to excuse her from responsibility for those effects. Emissions released 
before scientists suspected anthropogenic global warming was possible (call these 
“emissions under ignorance”) were created by polluters who were excusably 
ignorant that greenhouse gases could be so harmful. Therefore we should respond 
to parties’ excusable ignorance about the effects of emitting greenhouse gases by 
exempting them from responsibility for their emissions under ignorance (cf. Page 
2008; Singer 2004: 34).  
 
To be plausible, the excusable ignorance defence must overcome two major 
objections: the objection from benefits and the objection from strict liability.  
The objection from benefits argues that, since currently extant parties have 
benefitted from their own historical polluting, it is fair to ask them to pay for all 
their emissions, even those produced under ignorance (at least until the costs they 
are asked to bear match the benefits they have gained). I put aside this objection 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Around half of the CO2 emissions since 1750 have been released by individuals who are now 
dead. (CO2 data from Houghton (2008) and Boden et al (2011), world population data from 
United States Census Bureau (2012) except for 1947-1942, 1922-1907 from Wolfram Alpha 
(2012); 1927-37 from League of Nations (cited in Manning (2008)). Calculations available in 
Kingston (2012)). As to other types of actor, most firms from the historical period will have 
also disappeared - one estimate has the average “life-expectancy” of a corporation as “well 
below 20 years”, with only a very few passing 40 or 50 years (de Geus: 52-53).  
39For an argument that, at least in the case of climate change, members of collectives should 
not directly bear the burdens created by their forebears, see Caney (2006). For a general 
defence of the transferability of historical responsibility of collectives, see Miller (2004).  
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for now; I address it in Chapter Five. The objection from strict liability states that 
in certain situations, we are perfectly willing to demand that agents be morally 
responsible for the effects of their actions, regardless of their ignorance (at the 
time) of the consequences of those actions. The historical release of greenhouse 
gases by those ignorant of its effects, according to this objection, should be one of 
these cases (Gardiner 2004; Neumayer 2000; Shue 1999).  
 
Strict liability seems to be overly harsh on those who cause unexpected harm. If 
my spitting an orange pip off the side of a mountain path happens to cause a 
rockslide below, we would not ordinarily judge that I was morally responsible for 
the harm the rockslide causes (D. Miller 2004). Why should the case of the 
unexpected harm caused by early emitters be any different? Shue suggests that a 
commitment to equal dignity can justify applying strict liability here: 
 
If there were an inequality between two groups of people such that members of 
the first group could create problems and then expect members of the second 
group to deal with the problems, that inequality would be incompatible with 
equal respect and equal dignity. For the members of the second group would in 
fact be functioning as servants for the first group. If I said to you, 'I broke it, but I 
want you to clean it up', then I would be your master and you would be my 
servant. If I thought that you should do my bidding, I could hardly respect you as 
my equal (Shue 1999: 535).  
 
Shue is right that expecting others to deal with the problems one creates is a self-
serving attitude normally incompatible with a principle of equal dignity. But it is a 
mistake to characterise the excusable ignorance defence as a straightforward 
instance of such an attitude. In Shue’s characterisation, the first group rejects strict 
liability but also demands that the second group bear all the burdens. There are 
better alternatives. As I will argue later in this chapter, the burdens from 
excusably ignorant historical emitters (regardless of whether those emitters are 
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still around) should be assigned by a secondary principle of justice, an ability-
based principle. Other elements are also missing from Shue’s characterisation. The 
passage of time between a breakage and the clean-up effort is insufficient on its 
own to remove the obligation of someone who breaks something, but surely is a 
mitigating factor. Further, Shue’s focus on historical emitters “creating problems” 
and the metaphor of a breakage creates associations with negligence, for habitual 
activity that causes problems like breakages very often is negligent behaviour. 
And negligent behaviour certainly can carry strong moral responsibility for any ill 
effects. But historical emitters were not negligent.40 Taking all these differences 
into account gives us a picture rather different from Shue’s. Instead of saying “I 
broke it, but I want you to clean it up”, currently alive parties who caused 
historical emissions under ignorance are saying: “I broke the atmosphere’s ability 
to absorb greenhouse gases safely, in ignorance of its value, without acting 
negligently, many decades ago. Given that we now have differing abilities to clean 
up, we should contribute to the clean-up effort in accordance with our abilities. 
Any breaking of the atmosphere’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases after the time 
I became aware of its value I will certainly clean up myself.” This is radically 
different from the pronouncement of a master to a servant, and is compatible with 
a commitment to equal dignity.  
 
Supporters of strict liability in the case of climate change sometimes point to legal 
precedent. Under many legal systems, strict liability applies to a range of activities 
in both civil and criminal law: inherently dangerous activities, driving, and the 
                                                          
40Negligence is often defined as not taking reasonable care. If early emitters did not know of 
climate harms, reasonable care would not require them to abstain from emitting. An opponent 
might be tempted to cast the whole project of resource-intensive industrialisation as negligent, 
once the associated general harms to the environment had become obvious. But the harms of 
industrial activity that were evident in the early 20th century were typically area-limited 
effects such habitat destruction and local air pollution. The publication of Rachel Carson’s 
Silent Spring (1962) is typically regarded as the first recognition of global effects of pollutants 
emitted locally. Further, one could charge that to cautiously reduce resource-intensive 
industrialisation would also be negligent because it is not taking reasonable care of the 
material needs of people at the time.  
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sale of products that harm consumers41. For these activities, actors are often held 
legally responsible for serious harm caused by their actions even if they were 
taking reasonable care not to cause harm. More specifically, there is precedent for 
the use of strict liability in environmental law, both internationally and in the US 
(Boyle 1990, 2005; Gardiner 2004; Klass 2004).  
 
But as Bell (2011b) points out, the application of strict liability within 
environmental law is usually reserved for those committing dangerous or unusual 
activities. For example, in United States environmental law, activities that are “a 
matter of common usage” are not subject to strict liability (Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, (cited in Klass 2004: 918)). Burning coal and oil has been a matter of 
common usage - the very reason why global warming is a problem now. Appeals 
to legal precedent are insufficient to ground the objection from strict liability.  
 
The excusable ignorance defence can survive the objection from strict liability, and 
(I argue in Chapter 5) the objection from benefits. However, it does require some 
clarification with respect to the question of ignorance. In particular, if it is possible 
for emitters to be excusably ignorant, at what point do emissions become the 
responsibility of the emitter? We also face a question of historical fact: when did 
this change occur? This is not the place to settle the question of historical fact, but I 
will touch on it while I treat the question of clarification, and thus present an 
upper and a lower date, before which emissions of greenhouse gases should be 
judged as being produced under excusable ignorance. 
 
                                                          
41 Perhaps one could argue that strict liability should apply to oil and coal companies because 
their products turned out to be harmful. But this would be controversial, not least because 
applying strict liability in the case of harmful products was a legal move intended to reduce 
the difficulty of winning cases where negligence was very hard to prove. For an example of 
contemporary reluctance to accept strict liability see Hart (1968: 20) who notes that strict 
liability has been “admitted as an exception to the general rule, with the sense that an 
important principle has been sacrificed to secure a higher measure of conformity and 
conviction of offenders”. 
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4.1.4 When Should Polluter Pays Start to Apply? 
 
The theoretical possibility that the world’s climate might change due to human 
activity was proposed as early as 1896 – should this be the date at which excusable 
ignorance should cease to exempt parties from Polluter Pays? At the other 
extreme, human-induced climate change is denied even today by a majority of US 
residents (Yale Project on Climate Change Communication 2011). Could people 
still be excusably ignorant of the harms of greenhouse gas emissions? We need a 
standard by which to judge what constitutes excusable ignorance.  
 
Peter Singer (2004: 34) suggests that a legitimate standard for the end of excusable 
ignorance is when “solid evidence” of the hazards of CO2 emissions emerged in 
the scientific community (according to him, this was around 1990). Excusable 
ignorance existed, according to Singer, while agents polluted when they “could 
not know” (italics mine) of the limits of the capacity of the atmosphere to absorb 
gases.42  
 
Paul Baer (2008) remains undecided on the issue, but suggests that a different 
standard for judging excusable ignorance might be justified. He counts some 
events much earlier than 1990 as possibly relevant to the removal of the excusable 
ignorance exemption. These include the threat of anthropogenic global warming 
being recognised by the US Johnson Administration in the 1960’s, by some 
universities in the 1940’s, and by Svante Arrhenius in 1896. Such dates might 
indeed be relevant if the suspicion of a scientific minority, rather the knowledge of 
a majority, was the crucial element in removing the excusable ignorance 
exemption for historical emissions. 
 
                                                          
42Edward Page (2008: 560) also mentions the “widespread ignorance” of “the nature and scale 
of global climate change” until the 1990’s as a relevant mitigating factor in polluters’ liability. 
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I propose that, generally, once it is reasonable for an agent to suppose that her 
action has the potential to cause systemic harm, she is morally responsible for the 
effects of that action. This conjecture seems particularly plausible where the harm 
is due to fall on especially vulnerable people (cf. Barry 2005), as is the case with 
climate change. A distinction is necessary here. I have not said that agents at the 
time of suspicion should have begun to act cautiously,43 rather, that this is the 
point at which moral liability should start to be applicable. The latter is surely 
what we are interested in when we consider whether historical emissions should 
be exempt from a “polluter pays” principle.  
 
The difference is worth stressing, and can be seen more clearly if we place 
ourselves in the position of the actors in question. Some scientists suspect that 
increased levels of extra-high and extra-low frequency electromagnetic radiation 
from wireless phones and power lines will harm us (Draper et al. 2005; Hardell et 
al. 2009), although the evidence is far from strong (Maslanyj et al. 2010), while the 
benefits of technologies that cause increased electromagnetic radiation are large. 
Asking those agents responsible for increasing the amount of such radiation 
(telecommunication and electricity companies, as well as the consumers creating 
demand for the technology) to desist from their activities in the name of caution 
would be rash. On the other hand, asking such agents to take responsibility for 
any eventual systemic harm from the large increase in electromagnetic radiation 
might be fair. Many instances of increased electromagnetic radiation will present 
benefits great enough that agents will be willing to take the risk and continue to 
produce and develop and use the radiation-emitting technology, as long as the 
payoff is worth the risk. On the other hand, stressing actors’ liability for potential 
harm at the stage of mere suspicion does discourage profligate and unnecessary 
                                                          
43This extreme view would be justified by a precautionary principle strong enough to render 
any action which we were not convinced of the safety of as unadvisable. But any 
precautionary principle this strong would prohibit any novel activity, including regulation of 
the dangerous activity, as regulation poses its own risks. Hence Cass Sunstein’s accusation 
that precautionary principles are incoherent. Sunstein (2005: Chapter 1).  
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alteration of the environment – massive electromagnetic radiation to please one or 
two people, for instance.  
 
Now we can add an excusable ignorance clause to Polluter Pays (Total): 
 
Ignorance-Sensitive Polluter Pays (ISPP): Parties should bear the climate burden 
in proportion to their (total) contribution to its cause, not counting emissions 
produced before it was reasonable to suppose they had the potential of systemic 
harmful consequences.  
 
Even armed with ISPP, choosing any single date before which emissions can be 
judged to be emissions under ignorance would be a highly complex undertaking. 
Scientific suspicion about each of the different greenhouse gases arose at different 
times. Even if we focus on suspicion about the harmfulness of CO2, impediments 
(such as language barriers and fragmented scientific communities) could have 
excusably slowed dissemination of the scientific community’s suspicion. Finally, 
to suggest a single date as a threshold for responsibility might make our 
theorising easily applicable, but is unrealistic. In a world of gradations and 
complexity, it is nonsense to think that all agents suddenly acquired full 
responsibility for their emissions on January 1, 2000, 1990 or 1950.  
 
It will be impossible to be completely faithful to the gradual and uneven 
emergence of relevant suspicion when we put a principle like ISPP into practice, 
but in the spirit of pragmatism we can examine the question of which emissions 
were emissions under ignorance. It was not reasonable to suppose that human 
emissions of CO2 had significant harmful effects simply from the publication of 
Arrhenius’ ideas on the possibility of human induced global warming (Arrhenius 
1896). Arrhenius was no Cassandra – he was mainly concerned with the 
possibility that natural variations in CO2 explained the procession of ice ages and 
interglacial periods. He believed it would take thousands of years, rather than 
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decades, before the increase in CO2 from fossil fuel combustion would cause 
substantive warming. Moreover, his models were derided as overly simplistic by 
contemporaries (Weart 2011b). It was 1960 before measurements (taken from atop 
Hawaiian mountains to avoid local distortions) could detect that atmospheric CO2 
was steadily increasing (Weart 2011a). Before then, to be suspicious of CO2, 
scientists would need to believe two unlikely facts: that human emissions could 
cause CO2 to rise, and that this rise would be enough to warm the earth. However, 
I depart from Page and Singer’s assessment, noted earlier, by suggesting 1970 as a 
key date. In 1970 major scientific meetings were held addressing “possible impacts 
of man’s activities on the regional and global climate” (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) 1970: 1). The conclusion of climate scientists at such meetings 
was that more study was urgently needed, which makes it seem reasonable for 
people to suppose at that time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions were potentially 
harmful44, and so ISPP could be applicable to emissions of CO2 at that time. 
Certainly by 1990, at least, most individuals and collectives had ample reason to 
suspect that CO2 emissions carried risks of harmful climate change. Conversely, 
the lack of significant suspicion before 1970 should excuse all pre-1970 emissions 
from being allocated by a “polluter pays” principle. A compromise date between 
these two thresholds might be a rough approximation, or different dates for the 
removal of excusable ignorance could be applied to parties according to their 
circumstance.  
 
                                                          
44The study published after the meeting states “We have a conviction that man can influence 
the climate, especially if he proceeds at the present accelerating pace. We hope that the rate of 
progress of our understanding can match the growing urgency of taking action before some 
devastating forces are set in motion – forces that we are powerless to reverse” (MIT: 27). Much 
is often made of the fact that, through the 1970’s, global cooling was apparently perceived to be 
as serious a risk as global warming (e.g. Holcombe 2006). However, a recent review (Peterson 
et al. 2008) of early climate change science has found much more evidence of scientific concern 
over warming rather than cooling, even in the 1970’s. Even if cooling were as great a concern 
in the 1970’s as warming was, this would render most polluters even more liable for their past 
emissions. For it is the same activities that were linked to global warming – the burning of 
fossil fuels – that were suspected to have the potential to cause global cooling.  
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How large does this make the historical portion of the no-fault burden? It is 
impossible to be exact, but we can point to some key facts. Humankind has 
emitted roughly 2000 billion tonnes of CO2 since the industrial revolution. Around 
1400 billion tonnes of this was emitted before 1990, and 900 billion tonnes of it 
before 1970 (Boden et al. 2011; Houghton 2008). If the date at which parties 
became responsible for their emissions under ISPP lies somewhere between 1970 
and 1990 this means that between 44% and 67% of total CO2 emissions have been 
emitted by parties who were excusably ignorant.45 Of course CO2 is not the only 
greenhouse gas, but the short decay times of HCFC-22 and methane mean that the 
warming potential from historical emissions of these gases are not as great that of 
CO2, so historical proportions of these gases may count for less (Meehl et al. 2007: 
824-5). 
 
In the long term, the historical portion of the no-fault burden will be 
comprehensively outweighed by the cumulative total of the fault burden. For now 
that we know about the consequences of greenhouse gas emissions, future 
emissions can be attributed to the emitters under ISPP. 46 But the date at which 
this will happen is truly far off. Even in 2050 the proportion of cumulative 
emissions that were produced before 1970 is projected to be still a sizeable 25%.47 
                                                          
45Calculated using data from Houghton (2008) and Boden et al. (2011). The proportion should 
be reduced by a certain factor, because due to decay and concentration effects, a tonne of CO2 
emitted in 1963 does not have the same warming effect as a tonne emitted in 2011. But this 
will probably not be a drastic reduction, as the long time scale on which the ocean absorbs 
and radiates heat means present and past emissions will continue to have warming effects on 
the rest of the earth (Solomon et al. 2007: 68). On the other hand, we also could judge 
(especially if we were taking a strictly individualist stance) that the no-fault burden should be 
increased from the ensuing fraction by a certain factor, for some of the parties who have 
created emissions since the threshold of ignorance was crossed have disappeared, meaning 
there are extra no-fault emissions – those emitted by the now-deceased even after the 
threshold of ignorance had been crossed.  
46Even if current emitters manage to pass away without discharging their responsibilities, 
those who have received the benefits of those emissions should inherit their responsibility, 
since a ”beneficiary pays” principle based on past injustice could now apply. See Chapter Five.  
47Calculated with data from Boden et al. (2011) and Houghton (2008) 
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Still, the effect of historical no-fault CO2 emissions dwarfs that of current CO2 
emissions, which stand at 35 billion tonnes of CO2 annually. Were it not for the no-
fault emissions, the burdens of mitigation, adaptation, and compensation that 
parties face today would be lower. We also need to reach some agreement on how 
to distribute the climate burden as soon as possible. We must distribute it fairly as 
it stands, rather than erroneously assuming that past emissions have made little 
difference to our current predicament, or that soon enough they will be so 
insignificant that we can forget about them.  
 
Given that excusable ignorance should exempt the part of the climate burden 
created before (at least) 1970 from being allocated by a “polluter pays” principle, 
finding the best way to allocate this burden is very important. I will try to do so 
later in this chapter. First, though, I will explore the other portion of the no-fault 
burden – that portion created by the desperately poor. 48 
 
4.1.5 Further Exemptions – Poverty-Related Emissions.  
 
Very many of the world’s inhabitants are desperately poor. 1.4 billion people live 
on less than the equivalent of $1.25 per day49 (World Bank 2005: 67), 14% of the 
world suffers systemic undernourishment (World Bank 2005: 112) and around 
                                                          
48Besides the climate change caused by historical emissions emitted by people who no longer 
exist, Caney also points out that there is quite plausibly some portion of global warming that 
is not caused by people – a portion caused by cyclical variation, sunspots or other natural 
phenomenon. Caney wants to allocate responsibility for the accompanying non-
anthropogenic set of harms to some actor. This is because, he states, from the victim’s point of 
view, it does not matter from what quarter her interests are disturbed, but rather that she 
should be offered protection or compensation for the disruption to her vital interests (Caney 
2010). As I see it, judging naturally caused global warming as part of the no-fault burden 
seems to rely on significant positive rights to subsistence, life and health. To broaden the 
appeal of my two-track theory, I will not include naturally caused climate change as a no-fault 
burden. This omission might have some bearing on the appropriate magnitude of the climate 
tasks (which I do not discuss in this thesis) but has no bearing on the allocation of the climate 
burden, since it will need to be borne, whatever its size.  
49The $USD 1.25 figure refers to the equivalent in local purchasing power parity.  
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17% of adults cannot read and write (Central Intelligence Agency 2010: [online]). 
Applying the “polluter pays” principle to the greenhouse gas emissions of these 
already severely disadvantaged people would mean assigning an unacceptably 
grave burden to those with already very limited opportunities and resources. 
 
As mentioned earlier, we have defined “contribution” in ISPP as total emissions, 
rather than emissions above what would be a sustainable equal per capita level. 
So to protect the vital interests of the very poor we must make the “polluter pays” 
principle itself “poverty sensitive” (Caney 2010: 218). I will formalise it thus:  
 
Poverty and Ignorance Sensitive Polluter Pays (PISPP): Parties should bear the 
climate burden in proportion to their (total) contribution to its cause, not counting 
emissions produced before they were suspected by a significant proportion of the 
relevant scientific community to have the potential of systemic harmful 
consequences, unless doing so would seriously threaten their basic needs [or those 
of their members]. 
 
One might think that such an exemption from the “polluter pays” principle for the 
desperately poor must be motivated by an acceptance of sufficientarian or 
egalitarian patterns of welfare distribution, or a commitment to extensive positive 
rights. Caney seems to suggest this: “If one holds, as I do, that people should not 
fall beneath a certain standard of living then the Polluter Pays Principle should be 
qualified to prevent it being the case that people are made to pay for emissions 
needed for their fundamental survival” (Caney 2010: 213 [italics mine] ). But one 
need not subscribe to a particular theory of distributive justice, or hold that people 
should have the positive right to escape poverty, in order to accept the poverty-
sensitivity clause. PISPP can be justified by the idea that the principles of burden-
sharing we take up to prevent harm to others should not cause the same degree of 
harm amongst the polluters we require payment from. Perhaps sufficientarianism 
or something similar will be needed to justify a strong reading of ‘basic needs’ in 
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the clause above, but the poverty-sensitivity aspect itself can be justified from a 
(negative) rights-based framework too. If our concern to distribute the burdens of 
climate change is due to our desire to not let the basic rights of future people be 
jeopardised,50 this reason will justify exempting the emissions of the very poor 
from being subject to a “polluter pays” principle. To include the emissions of the 
very poor under such a principle would be to violate their right not to be 
interfered with in seeking their own basic survival. This would be a rights 
violation of the same magnitude that the burden-sharing has been proposed to 
prevent, and so the poverty sensitive clause should be added to prevent such a 
counter-productive result.  
 
Ascertaining at this point the relative level of those no-fault emissions that are 
generated by the severely poor would be very difficult. To define exactly which 
emissions would be exempt under PISPP due to the poverty of the emitter 
depends on what we judge are “basic needs”. Further, if we were to take the 
justification above for the principle this would lead us to consider two unclear 
factors. One is the extent of the harm that climate change is expected to impose on 
people, the other is how much of the world is so poor that they cannot be asked to 
bear any burdens because to do so would create the same degree of harm. 
Whatever we want to say about these issues, it is true that some are so desperately 
poor that to ask them to pay for the effects of their emissions would be wrong, so 
their emissions form the second part of the no-fault burden. 
                                                          
50For an argument that future people have no rights to be jeopardised, see Beckerman and 
Pasek (2001), Chapter 1. For a defence of the idea that climate change violates the rights of 
future people, see Bell (2011a). 
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4.1.6 Ability to Pay 
 
The no-fault burden is made up of the burden created under ignorance and the 
burden from the emissions of the very poor. Responsibility for the no-fault burden 
cannot be attributed by PISPP to any extant party, but this does not mean that it 
can be ignored. The costs associated with it must either be allocated deliberately 
or they will fall on the victims of climate change selected by the vagaries of 
geophysical systems and realpolitik. Caney points out that making the very poor 
pay for the no-fault burden would be wrong (indeed, part of the no-fault burden 
is made up of emissions we exempted the current poor from having to pay). The 
same intuition, according to Caney, should make a laissez-faire attitude to the no-
fault burden just as repellent. This is because it is again the very poor in the 
tropics and most especially in vulnerable regions such as Bangladesh, the Nile 
Delta and small island states, who will be asked to bear the costs of climate change 
without compensation or adaptation (GHF 2009: 58-66). Requiring stringent duties 
of mitigation, adaptation and compensation from current polluters in proportion 
to their current emissions51 would prevent the worst off from bearing the entire 
no-fault burden, but would be unfair on current heavy emitters. For they would 
now be asked to bear others’ burdens, over and above the cost of their own 
pollution. An ability-based principle provides a way out. No-fault emissions have 
created a bad situation that requires a remedy, and the creators of the situation 
cannot be held accountable. Under such circumstances, if our goal is to put a bad 
situation right, it makes sense to assign responsibility to those most able to put it 
right (D. Miller 2001: 460-1). To put climate change right is to undertake the 
climate tasks: to prevent its worst effects, help those who will be stricken by it to 
prepare, and compensate those who will suffer from it. We should look to who is 
most able to take up these tasks. This brings us to my initial version of an “ability 
to pay” principle.  
                                                          
51As suggested by Singer (2004) and Weijers et al. (2010). 
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Ability to Pay: Parties should pay for the no-fault burden, because they are able to 
and in proportion to their ability. 
 
It is hard to find examples of direct criticism of such a principle in the case of 
climate ethics.52 Emphasising the relevance of an alternative principle that can 
assign responsibilities for the no-fault burden is more common. A popular 
candidate for such a principle is that those who have benefitted from such 
emissions should bear the associated burdens (Caney 2010; Das in preparation; 
Page 2008, 2011a). I postpone objections against the “beneficiary pays” idea until 
the next chapter. 
 
Ability to Pay is presented abstractly; deep and difficult questions remain about 
what “ability” is. I can turn to this complex question only briefly.  
 
I suggest the following comparative definition: party A has more ability to pay 
climate costs than party B if they can do so with a lesser decrease in their relevant 
goods, where decreases are measured proportionate to A and B’s respective goods. 
This of course raises the question: what are the correct measures of a party’s 
goods? Should they involve subjective measures such as welfare, or objective 
                                                          
52Page (2011a) sees ability as an unfair measure by which to distribute proportionate burdens 
(although he thinks ability should play a role in dividing burden-bearers from non burden-
bearers) because states that have developed “responsibly” with low-emissions technologies 
will be asked to pay as much as similarly able states that have developed irresponsibly. But 
this objection fails to apply when Ability to Pay is being used only as a secondary principle for 
allocating burdens from no-fault emissions. The recent emissions history of clean and dirty 
states will be taken into account by a “polluter pays” principle, and the distant (pre-1970) 
history should be judged to be morally irrelevant (see sub-sections 4.1.3-4.1.4.) so the cleaner 
state’s complaint is groundless. Stephen Gardiner (2004) questions Martino Traxler’s claim 
that his capacity-based approach is uniquely placed to overcome the prisoner’s-dilemma 
structure of climate change politics (Traxler 2002), a claim I am not making about Ability to 
Pay. Moellendorf’s criticism – that Traxler’s approach is too demanding on the poorest 
(Moellendorf 2009) – can be accommodated by refining of the idea of proportionate burdens 
(see later in this section). 
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measures such as wealth, or a nuanced approach which focuses on people’s 
capabilities? Choosing between these measures involves entering the debate about 
the correct “currency of justice” (Dworkin 2004: 340-41; D. Miller 2008: 147), which 
I cannot do adequately here. 
 
Things become simpler if we focus on the form that the costs of the climate tasks 
will take. Under most conceptions of the climate tasks, the costs will be monetary, 
or at least material. For example, mitigation tasks might lead to increased energy 
costs and tighter regulations on energy efficiency, compensation and adaptation 
tasks to an extra demand on government revenue.53  
 
Given that the costs of the climate tasks are, in the first instance, material, we can 
avoid the question of the correct currency of justice by continuing to use the 
placeholder “relevant goods”. For regardless of whether the most important 
goods are subjective or objective, those with more material wealth seem better 
able to absorb the costs of climate change with the least long-term losses 
(proportionate to holdings) in the kinds of things we might care about people 
having. For this reason, ability to pay should be at least linked to a measure of 
material wealth, although perhaps in a non-linear way. 54  The more material 
wealth a party has, the fewer goods they risk losing through absorbing the costs of 
climate tasks.  
 
But our “ability to pay” idea is still ambiguous. Our world contains great 
inequality. Do the wealthiest have all the ability to pay, if they can bear all the 
                                                          
53It is true that many mitigation tasks, such as home insulation and increased energy efficiency 
are actually “no-regrets policies” which economically rational actors would get a net benefit 
from (Pacala and Socolow 2004). But climate change cannot be solved using only no-regrets 
policies (Miller, 2011: 87-92).  
54If the relevant benefits were judged to be subjective, the relationship between wealth and 
ability might take into account, for example, the principle of diminishing marginal utility and 
empirical data about the limited impact of wealth increases on well-being once a threshold of 
wealth is reached (Layard et al. 2012: 60-66). 
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losses without dropping to the level of holdings of the next set? Or should we 
consider that ability to pay is spread, albeit unevenly, across the range of wealth 
levels, with every party able to pay to some extent? An example will help.  
 
Let us imagine a simplified world with just three parties. A has 100 wealth units, 
party B, 30, and party C, 1.  
 
Table 1. Differing conceptions of ‘ability to pay’ 
 
 
Each conception in the table above seems compatible with what I have said about 
ability being capacity to bear costs with the least drop in proportionate holdings. 
But we can rule out Scaled immediately, for it is too harsh on the poorest, C. The 
conception that requires the poorest countries or individuals to bear any of the 
climate burden can be ruled out by the same poverty-sensitive consideration that 
we added to our “polluter pays” principle - allocating the climate tasks should not 
cause the same harms they are intended to prevent. We need to decide, then, 
whether we should follow High Threshold, requiring only the richest to pay, or Low 
Threshold, requiring all parties except the very poorest to bear some burden.  
 
High Threshold considers climate costs in a marginal sense; the cost of contributing 
one more dollar to a climate fund would constitute a lesser drop in proportionate 
wealth (and presumably in other goods) for A than it would for B, until A’s 
 
 
A (100 wealth 
units) 
B (30 wealth units) C (1 wealth unit) 
Scaled Major ability Medium ability  Minor ability  
High Threshold All the ability No ability No ability  
Low Threshold Major ability  Medium ability  No ability 
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wealth was reduced greatly. Low Threshold tries to share the total costs of climate 
change among all parties except the very poor, in proportion to their ability to 
pay. Our intuitions about the desirability of each conception will be influenced by 
our background commitments to particular theories of political philosophy. But 
there are reasons against choosing High Threshold that are largely independent of 
such background commitments. In the case of climate change, this would mean 
that the wealthiest party, or more plausibly, a highly wealthy group of parties, 
should bear all the cost of no-fault emissions. The Kyoto Protocol distributes its 
(inadequate) costs by such a mechanism.55 The theoretical objection to this is that 
the approach represents a kind of climate-specific egalitarianism. Proportions of 
burdens are given to a top tier only, presumably because parties are asked to 
move towards (more) equal holdings, and any holdings above the threshold are 
thus expendable. Some of course may be quite unconvinced by the importance of 
such a move towards equal holdings. Others may be convinced, but suggest that if 
such a move should be made, it should be made in general terms, rather than 
through the specific (blunt) instrument of climate burden allocation (Posner and 
Weisbach 2010: 86ff).  
 
One pragmatic objection is that using Ability to Pay to separate a minority of 
burden-bearers from the non burden-bearers risks creating a divisive us-and-them 
scenario, perhaps one of the reasons climate negotiations have been so slow-
moving. Another is that applying ambitious portions of the no-fault burden to the 
minority of able parties may quickly push them below the threshold of ability, and 
others may rise above it. The associated political manoeuvring and conflict 
                                                          
55The Kyoto Protocol distinguishes between Annex I countries that bear burdens and non-
Annex 1 countries that bear no burdens, although the UNFCCC norm of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” suggest that a dual rationale 
(historic emitting and current capability) rather than simply ability to pay is being used. A 
high or mid-threshold approach has been suggested by Weijers et al. (2010) (with a three-tier 
approach) and Page (2010). 
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involved in the rearrangement of parties around the threshold would further 
delay needed action on climate change.  
 
The Low Threshold interpretation of the “ability to pay” principle avoids the above 
objections. It does not represent a narrow climate-specific egalitarianism. Its 
poverty-sensitive threshold need not be as politically divisive as a high threshold, 
as graded contributions would ensure that those parties just above the threshold 
will bear burdens little different from those below the threshold, and should also 
be receiving benefits of adaption and compensation.  
 
Thus we reach a refined ability-based principle: 
 
Ability to Pay’: Parties should pay for the no-fault burden, in proportion to their 
capacity to absorb their total share of the costs of climate tasks with the least drop 
in proportionate relevant benefits, unless doing so would seriously threaten their 
basic needs.  
 
As noted earlier, because the costs of climate tasks are initially material, this 
ability could be modelled by a measure of wealth, perhaps in a non-linear way, if 
the relevant benefits are non-material.56  
 
 
4.2 APPLICATION 
 
Having explained the two track theory, I will now apply it to two practical 
issues.57 I first consider and rebut the suggestion that my two-track theory justifies 
passing costs of climate change tasks on to future generations. I then turn to the 
question of emissions restrictions and allocation, rejecting schemes of emission 
                                                          
56See note 53. 
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allocation that involve equal-per-capita allowances and state-centred schemes in 
favour of a company-centred auction scheme.  
 
 
4.2.1 Against Discounting 
 
The two-track view I have been advocating proposes that the well-off should bear 
those costs that cannot or should not be borne by the polluters themselves. It is at 
least plausible that future generations will be better-off than us.58 Therefore one 
might be tempted to make the argument that future generations, according to the 
two-track view, should pay for the no-fault burden. There is a naive version of this 
argument that advances from the premise that future generations are expected to 
be wealthier on average than the current generation to the conclusion that we 
should leave the costs of climate change to them.59 This approach is flawed in that 
it does not disaggregate within generations (Caney 2009c: 171). Given the deep 
and pervasive inequality we have today, it is implausible to suggest that, even 
with a large amount of growth in average incomes, all parties in the future will be 
better off than those well-off parties who could pay for some mitigation measures 
today. 
 
A more sophisticated argument could be constructed. One might maintain that 
parties above a certain threshold of wealth – whether they belong to the present or 
the future – should bear the cost of the no-fault burden. According to this point of 
view, it just happens that many more people in the future will be above that 
                                                                                                                                                                               
57Section 4.2 owes much to the recent work of Simon Caney, who has addressed at length the 
question of how principles of justice similar to those I propose should be applied to global 
climate policy (Caney 2009b, 2011). 
58This is assumed by economists focusing on climate change such as Nicholas Stern (2007: 161-
162) and William Nordhaus (2008:11, 169-175) 
59This argument seems to be typical of several economists who include such a factor as part of 
a high discount rate for future costs and benefits for example Nordhaus (2008: 169-175) and 
Robert Mendelsohn (2006).  
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threshold, so it happens to be mainly wealthy parties from future generations that 
should bear the costs of the no-fault burden. 
 
How should we respond to this argument? To begin with we should treat 
sceptically the empirical claim that future generations will, on average, be much 
richer than us. It is not at all clear whether we are sure enough of this to justify 
passing costs on to these currently non-existent parties. One might point to the 
current economic crisis, deep-seated political instability (Huntington 1992) or 
limits of natural resources such as oil (Deffeyes 2001) water (Gleick and 
Palaniappan 2010) and phosphorus (Déry and Anderson 2007) as reasons to doubt 
future affluence. Alternatively, one might point out that the costs of dealing with 
climate change will rise if early mitigation is not performed (N. H. Stern 2007: 
211ff, 405). If the costs rise faster than future wealth does, wealthy parties in the 
future should be judged to have less ability to pay due to the higher costs of the 
deferred climate tasks. We also might doubt whether future generations will be 
willing to bear the burden of climate change. If they are likely to be unwilling (and 
why should they bear it if we have not?) we should not attempt to pass the burden 
on to them. (Caney 2009c; Gardiner 2006).  
 
Most importantly perhaps, we should rely on the general principle that increases 
in wealth and the transfer of wealth to injured parties cannot fully compensate for 
harms done, especially when those harms involve rights violations or disturb the 
fundamental interests of persons (Caney 2009c). So while future individuals may 
(arguably) be more able to pay in terms of wealth, the task they can meet - 
compensation - is the task of last resort. The tasks that should be borne – mitigation 
and adaptation – cannot be paid for by future individuals, they must be paid now. 
60  
                                                          
60This leads John Broome (2010) to recommend borrowing from the future to pay the costs of 
climate change now.  
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4.2.2 Emissions Allocation – Equal Per Capita?  
 
Having rejected the claim that mitigation can be put off due to the expected 
wealth of future generations, it is to the task of mitigation that we now turn. Any 
discussion of significant mitigation efforts must deal with the question of how 
entitlements to emit greenhouse gas emissions should be distributed among 
parties. 61  I have already criticised the main case for a moral ground for 
“grandfathering” emissions rights in Chapter Three. Here I will present important 
objections to another popular view, that every person has an equal share in the 
global commons that is the atmosphere’s ability to absorb CO2. 
 
The equal-shares view has its supporters among philosophers (Gosseries 2005; 
Singer 2004) and NGOs (Oxfam International: 24). In the world of environmental 
policy and activism this view is referred to as “Contract and Converge” (Global 
Commons Institute 2011: 1ff.). It states that total emissions must contract, and 
shares of this total must converge towards an equal per capita assignment. These 
assignments, while theoretically granted to every global citizen, are usually 
proposed to be allocated to states by multiplying their population by the equal per 
capita quota. 62  
 
Simon Caney (2009a, 2011) provides several forceful objections to this view. The 
first identifies the view above as an example of the political theory of resourcism, 
which holds that we should be concerned with the distribution of resources - 
income, social goods, or in this case, rights to emit. We can make the general 
criticism against resourcism, denying the claim that goods are what should be 
                                                          
61 As Caney notes, even if a carbon tax system is applied rather than a cap and trade system, 
this still concerns energy rights: if parties are judged to have lesser energy rights this might be 
instantiated by their being subjected to higher taxes. See Caney (2011b) for more on this.  
62Usually their population fixed at some year in the past, or a fixed future projection, in order 
to avoid perverse incentives for population growth (Singer 2004). 
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equalized and point out that quality of life, or capabilities, is what should be 
equalised. And some individuals, through no fault of their own, have a greater 
need to emit CO263 in order to achieve the same quality of life or capabilities as 
others. Consider the heating requirements of those who live in very cold climates, 
the elderly and the very young, or the transport requirements of someone isolated 
in an area of very low population density (the Australian Outback, for example). 
Assigning an allocation of emissions rights to a person in this situation that is 
equal to the allocation for a person in a sub-tropical climate with no real need for 
private transport and artificial heating or cooling seems unjust. People may also 
differ greatly in their access to clean energy sources. For example, due to the vast 
energy resources of Brazil’s rivers, less than 17% of the electricity used by 
Brazilians is generated from fossil fuels, while 93% of the electricity used by South 
Africans is generated by burning fossil fuels.64 It seems quite odd to grant people 
in such varying situations strictly equal rights to emit.65 Further, even a committed 
resourcist should be concerned, Caney argues, with bundles of goods, rather than 
each good taken separately. A doctrine that everyone should hold equal shares of 
                                                          
63For clarity in the rest of this discussion I will consider allocation of the right to emit CO2. The 
idea of a general emissions scheme that covered all greenhouse gases (as Kyoto does) has been 
popular in the past, but some view the aggregation of greenhouse gases to be dealt with by a 
single policy instrument to be a mistake (e.g. Barrett 2007).  
64Calculated with data from the UN Statistics Division (2012a;2012b) 
65Admittedly this is only a limited objection to equal per capita rights. For there is a forward-
looking reason why we might be content to assign equal per capita emission rights despite the 
vastly different needs of people in different geo-physical regions. Having one’s emissions 
allowance “go further” because one lives in a populated, subtropical climate, say, could be 
seen as a reward for living in an area suited for low-carbon human habitation. Equalising 
emissions rights creates a long-term incentive for migration towards places where low-carbon 
living is easier. But as Alex Gosseries (2005) points out, in the first instance, many people have 
no choice or little choice about where they live, and even if they did, asking them to choose 
between freezing in winter and abandoning their homeland (say) when there is sufficient 
leeway in the global emissions budget to allow them to remain where they are would be cruel 
and unjust. Still, there could be a case to be made for a per capita allocation based on need 
that incrementally shifts, over the years, towards a more equal allocation in order to 
incentivise migration to areas of low-carbon living. But other forms of carbon emissions 
allocation than equal-per capita shares could be designed to incorporate similar incentives 
too.  
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every natural resource is absurd. Possessing large amounts of other goods should 
therefore decrease one’s claim to a share of the common right to emit CO2. Finally, 
Caney points out that there are many types of burdens of climate change - the 
actual harms that will come from it, other costly programs of mitigation, as well as 
the tasks of adaptation and compensation. If some party is bearing none of these 
other burdens, it seems unfair that they still be allocated an equal share of CO2 to 
that of a party who is bearing many. 
 
Could we not develop a pattern of distribution of that begins with equal shares, 
but is modified by the considerations Caney raises? Such a system seems overly 
complex. Even if it were possible to use the modified principle, we need a positive 
reason why it is desirable, rather than some other more parsimonious application 
of the two-track theory.  
 
 
4.2.3 Which Agent?  
 
Before I point to another way of using the two-track theory to allocate emissions, 
we should consider what kinds of party should be granted entitlements to emit: 
individuals, countries, or firms?  
 
One reason why states should not be allocated emission rights by the two track 
theory is the great differences in the relevant characteristics within states we noted 
in Chapter Two. For some low-emitting country could still contain a large section 
of its population with high emissions and high ability to pay, while some high 
emitting country could contain a significant amount of people whose emissions 
are very low, and who are very poor, at least relative to their community (Page 
2008). Treating states as the relevant rights-holders risks a distribution regime that 
benefits some rich high-polluters over some poor low-polluters, a benefit granted 
only by virtue of their state membership.  
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There is also an unwelcome political consequence of granting emissions rights to 
states. To avoid overly restrictive and economically damaging results, it is likely 
that any scheme of international emissions rights will involve trading (Page 
2011b). Some low-emitting countries will not use all their emissions rights and, 
especially if the government is corrupt and undemocratic, the benefits from the 
sale of these can flow directly to an already privileged elite. The possibility of this 
lucrative resource would also provide an incentive (in the form of an extra 
“resource privilege”) 66  for illegitimate governments to take over control of a 
country (Caney 2009a; Singer 2004).  
 
Overall, there is a strong case against allocating emission rights to states, but 
allocating emissions rights to individuals, as been suggested with personal carbon 
allowances, is also highly problematic. Personal carbon allowance schemes such 
as those proposed by Mayer Hillman (2004: 126-45) are usually unwieldy and 
involve transaction costs that are too high to be feasible even at a national level 
(Defra 2008). Analysts have called personal carbon allowances at a national level a 
“radical and innovative policy with no experience or evidence base, and 
therefore… surrounded by debate, uncertainty and doubt” (Seyfang 2007: 365). If 
it is difficult for already established states to grant permits for and monitor all the 
emissions that their members make, it must be very much more so for an 
international institution to do so on a global level. Caney claims that to rely on the 
possibility of such a global institution would be “highly utopian” (Caney 2011: 
87). Others might prefer somewhat less complimentary descriptions of such a 
regime. Allocating emissions rights to individuals seems far from ideal. 
 
 
                                                          
66See (Pogge 2005) for an explanation but for an alternative view in this context, (D.Miller 
2008). 
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4.2.4 An Alternative Practical Framework 
 
We might, however, be able to abandon the assumption that it is emissions rights 
that must be deliberately allocated according to a moral principle (Caney 2009a). 
Perhaps emissions rights should simply be sold to the highest bidders, and the 
moral work should take place in determining the just distribution of the proceeds 
from selling such rights (Caney 2009a; Tickell 2008). Oliver Tickell’s Kyoto2 
scheme exemplifies such an approach. Shares of the global right to emit 
greenhouse gases would be auctioned off to the firms that wish to be able to create 
such emissions (or sell the products which eventually create such emissions) as 
‘upstream’ as possible, for example, when fossil fuels leave the ground. Most of 
this extra cost to firms, we can assume, will be passed onto consumers of fossil-
fuels or fossil-fuel intensive products and services, so the “polluter pays” 
principle would be honoured directly at the level of the corporation but also 
indirectly at the level of the state and the individual.67 To ensure that today’s 
global poor are not disadvantaged further by the scheme, firms in the poorest 
regions could be exempt, or the distribution of a dividend from the auction could 
make up for the increased cost of energy for those who need it for survival, 
addressing the poverty-sensitive aspect of PISPP (Caney 2009a, 2011).  
 
We should recall that PISPP was an appropriate principle for distributing only 
around half the burden of climate change – the fault burden. Can Kyoto2 also 
honour the importance of the no-fault burden and the role Ability to Pay’ should 
play in distributing it? In fact, it may not matter. For recall the range of climate 
tasks that make up the climate burden: tasks of mitigation, adaptation, and 
                                                          
67There is, of course, the burden of recent historical emissions between the end of ignorance 
and the present. To truly embody PISPP, Kyoto2 must make those responsible for producing 
this class of emissions pay somehow. I believe it can, through targeting the distribution of 
proceeds from the scheme in a similar way to the way Kyoto2 could deal with the no-fault 
burden (see below).  
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compensation. The restricting or pricing of emissions is only a sub-task of the 
mitigation task. Other mitigation tasks such as the imposition of energy standards 
or other regulations could be applied via Ability to Pay’, and burdens of adaptation 
and compensation, which will plausibly involve large monetary transfers, seem 
well suited to distribution via the “ability to pay” principle. If Kyoto 2 asks 
polluters to bear all the burdens of emissions restrictions, the well-off should take 
up the other burdens. 
 
If this seems unsatisfactory (perhaps because an emissions allocation scheme is the 
most feasible way to raise funds to undertake the other tasks68) Kyoto2 could also 
be modified to incorporate Ability to Pay’. Honouring Ability to Pay’ could be done 
by insisting that those who are in a position to pay increased energy costs should 
pay more of them – the “extra” amount that is due to the no-fault burden. How 
could that be done? Consider the very sizeable revenues that the Kyoto2 auction 
would create. Rough estimates have such a scheme raising $1 trillion per year 
(Tickell 2008: 169). Some of this might need to be set aside for adaptation or 
compensation for the sufferers of climate change and some, we have already seen, 
must be used to ensure that the development of today’s poorest is not hamstrung 
by higher energy costs. Still, there could be a sizeable amount left to spend on 
research and development of clean technology and incentives for its use. We could 
incorporate Ability to Pay’ into Kyoto2 by requiring these expenditures to be 
directed towards increasing access to clean energy for those of low and mid-level 
wealth. The wealthy would effectively bear both their share of the fault and the 
no-fault burdens, whereas those who pollute but are less wealthy would have 
their burden reduced through the application of auction proceeds to the 
development of clean energy, and so would bear only their share of the fault 
burden. 
                                                          
68Adaptation and compensation funds raised directly from states, for example, have not had a 
strong history. The 100bn Green Climate Fund, agreed to by rich nations in Copenhagen in 
2009, is proceeding slowly (Cuming 2011). 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
The two-track theory is sound and practically applicable. It is strict on current and 
recent polluting, yet does not demand too much from those who have polluted 
under mitigating circumstances, while still requiring the entire climate burden to 
be borne justly. If we do not believe that those who have benefitted from 
emissions under ignorance and emissions from the poor need to pay, then it seems 
to be the best theory. But I have thus far only dodged the “beneficiary pays” idea, 
and will address it in the next chapter, finding that it has only minor relevance in 
climate change ethics.  
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5 
 
Beneficiary Pays? 
 
 
Didst thou never hear that things ill-got had ever bad success? – William 
Shakespeare, Henry VI, part III, -- (1964 [1591]: Act ii, Sc. 2) 
 
 
5.1 THE “BENEFICIARY PAYS” IDEA 
 
In this chapter, I will argue against a prominent idea for distributing the costs of 
climate change: that those who have gained benefits from the acts that caused 
high greenhouse gas emissions in the past should pay for the harmful effects of 
those acts. I argue that the idea can take one of two different forms, neither of 
which succeeds. The first form – beneficiaries of injustice have a special 
responsibility to the victims of the injustice – is a plausible idea that probably does 
not apply straightforwardly to climate change. To apply, it requires further 
theories of distributive justice that either lend a greater support to an “ability to 
pay” principle, or are highly controversial and unusual. The second form – that 
beneficiaries of harmful acts have a special responsibility to those harmed – could 
theoretically apply to the case of climate change, but it is implausible. I conclude 
that the “beneficiary pays” idea should not play a major role in distributing 
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climate burdens. Finally, I consider special circumstances in climate negotiations 
which might allow some parties to appeal to a rather limited “beneficiary pays” 
principle.  
 
The “beneficiary pays” idea has been supported by a number of philosophers 
(Caney 2009a; Das in preparation; Gosseries 2004; Neumayer 2000; Page 2008, 
2011a; Shue 1999). It is especially promising as a way of distributing a large part of 
the climate burden – the burden caused by historical emissions created under 
ignorance 69  – to which a “polluter pays” principle should not be applied. 70 
Allocating the burden from past emissions to those who have benefitted could 
allow us to attribute responsibility to current parties for past emissions from those 
who have disappeared or were excusably ignorant (like an “ability to pay” 
principle). Further, it is sensitive to the nature of the past acts that brought about 
the climate burdens in the first place (like a “polluter pays” principle). Thus, 
linking responsibility to the benefits from past emissions can combine the 
advantages of each approach.71  
                                                          
69For ease of expression, I will in the rest of this chapter refer to these emissions simply as 
“past” or “historical” emissions, despite the fact that some emissions before the present day 
were not emitted under excusable ignorance. See Chapter Four for more details.  
70While it potentially can allocate the burden-share from historical emissions, the “beneficiary 
pays” idea would be hard pressed to guide the distribution of burdens from poverty-related 
emissions. This is because it is difficult to claim that the benefits from the emissions of the 
very poor accrue primarily to other parties than the very poor themselves.  
71It is sometimes suggested that the “beneficiary pays” idea must face the non-identity 
problem (Caney 2005). I believe that the non-identity problem to be irrelevant in the context of 
climate change. The problem is meant to be that we cannot meaningfully say that a person can 
ever be harmed or benefitted by events that happened before her conception. For each of us, 
our existence as a unique individual is dependent on the fact that a sperm with a particular 
arrangement of our father’s chromosomes out of the millions of candidates managed to 
fertilise our mother’s egg at a particular moment. But such a delicate matter is highly 
contingent on many other factors. The upshot of this for climate ethics, supposedly, is that it is 
nonsensical to judge that a particular person has benefitted from the past emissions events 
that occurred before her conception. Had the course of history been different enough to 
involve significantly lower emissions, the person in question would not exist at all, and one 
cannot compare her welfare now with her non-existence. But the “beneficiary pays” idea can 
survive the non-identity problem. We can couch the “beneficiary pays” principle in a non-
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5.2 WHICH PRINCIPLE? 
 
There are two quite different versions of the “beneficiary pays” idea in its general 
form. Here is a principle typical of one version.  
 
Beneficiary of Injustice Pays (BIP) Those holding benefits from unjust acts or 
practices should bear the burden associated with the original injustice, until the 
injustice has been fully rectified or the benefits that triggered the duty have been 
exhausted (adapted from Page 2011a: 422-23). 
 
And a principle typical of the other:  
 
Beneficiary of Harmful Acts Pays (BHP) Those holding benefits from acts or 
practices that are causing or will cause harms should bear the burden of rectifying 
those harms, until the harm has been fully rectified or the benefits that triggered 
the duty have been exhausted. 
 
 
5.2.1 BIP - Benefitting from Injustice 
 
In Section 5.3 I will argue that BHP is not a plausible principle. In the rest of this 
section I will show that the assumptions needed to ensure BIP applies to climate 
                                                                                                                                                                               
person-affecting or “impersonal” form, rather than a “person affecting” form (Page 2011: 424, 
Caney 2006) as has been done with the principles BIP and BHP (see main text). This involves 
shifting the focus of the central claim – from the subject who has benefitted, to the benefits 
simpliciter. Instead of requiring that rectification must come from certain persons who have 
benefitted from past industrialisation, it can require that the benefits of industrialisation, such 
as increased wealth, carry with them duties to pay for some of the climate harms that 
industrialisation has caused. If the particular identity of the agent is unimportant, the non-
identity problem loses its bite.  
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change are either implausible or lend even greater support to an “ability to pay” 
approach.  
 
Beneficiary of Injustice Pays states that because parties enjoy benefits derived 
from an injustice, they should bear the burdens associated with remedying that 
injustice.  
 
This principle or similar variants have received much discussion over the years, 
especially with application to the issue of affirmative action and reparations for 
slavery (Fullinwider 1975; Thomson 1973). Daniel Butt (2007) argues for it 
specifically as a way to distribute “remedial responsibility” to prevent what 
would be unacceptable harms to others. Edward Page supports this conception of 
the “beneficiary pays” idea in the context of climate change: “existing states are 
indirectly at fault so long as they continue to enjoy the benefits generated by this 
injustice without undertaking measures of mitigation, adaptation, or 
compensation”(Page 2011a: 422). BIP also plays a part in the work of Caney 
(2009b, 2010) and Neumayer (2000). As a general principle, BIP is defensible. 
Receiving benefits borne of injustice seems to give one special responsibility to 
rectify the injustice at least if the perpetrator cannot (or perhaps does not) do so. 
Imagine that I have received a quality university education, but only because my 
father (now dead) bribed an official in order for me to gain my place, at the 
expense of a more worthy candidate. I have not committed an injustice, but I have 
benefitted from the injustice and should be prepared to make amends, because I 
have benefitted from it. Or consider an example more closely related to climate 
change, because it involves the responsibility for rescuing others from 
unacceptable conditions. Imagine that person A is made destitute and person B 
rich by some action designed to harm the first person, by an enemy who is now 
dead. In the absence of the enemy, Butt plausibly claims, B has a special 
responsibility to use her new riches to rescue A from ruin (Butt 2007). Butt also 
provides an explanation of why we might want to support BIP; to fulfil the role of 
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genuine moral agents, it is not enough that we are unwilling to commit acts of 
injustice, but we must also “hold a genuine aversion to injustice and its lasting 
effects” (Butt 2007: 143). To condemn an act as unjust but refuse to relinquish 
goods caused by that injustice when one could remedy it is to commit a 
“conceptual error” – it is to misunderstand the nature of moral condemnation 
(Butt 2007: 143). 
 
 
5.2.2 Against BIP in Application to Climate Harms. 
 
BIP seems plausible, but much work has to be done to show that it is relevant to 
distributing the historical portion of the climate burden. BIP is a principle 
specifically for allocating benefits from unjust acts. But the acts that created the 
historical burden are not obviously unjust acts; emitting greenhouse gases under 
ignorance seems quite different from the acts of bribery and malicious harm that 
created the unjust enrichment in the small scale examples above. Rather than 
unjustly choosing to harm future people, most past heavy emitters could not have 
even suspected they were doing so, and can be excused because of this.72 Without 
doubt, we might regret that people emitted so much in the past under ignorance of 
the likely effects. But the acts of past emitting were not clearly unjust.  
 
Perhaps there is a significant counterfactual which renders the developed world’s 
appropriation of the ability of the atmosphere to safely absorb greenhouse gases 
unjust. Given the snail’s pace of emissions reductions among historically high 
emitters since the effects of greenhouse gases have been realised, one might 
charge that past emissions constitute an injustice because high emitters would not 
have adapted their behaviour even had they known the atmosphere was limited in 
its ability to absorb greenhouse gases (Singer 2004: 34).  
 
                                                          
72See Chapter Four for a detailed defence of this point.  
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This claim is contentious. After knowledge emerged of the limits of the 
atmosphere to safely absorb greenhouse gases, total emissions from the EU-15 (the 
15 EU members in 1995) dropped by more than 12% between 1990 and 2009 
despite the population growing by 8.5% (European Environment Agency 2011: 
6).73 Of course many mitigation policies make good sense domestically, so it may 
have been pure self-interest that led these countries to cut emissions. Nonetheless, 
this moderate decline in EU emissions after knowledge of climate harms became 
widespread makes it harder to argue that there would have been an irresponsible 
disregard of climate harms by all countries had the knowledge appeared earlier. 
And even if there would have been such disregard, this is not sufficient to show 
that past emitting was unjust. It is one thing to make the counterfactual claim that 
actors would have used as much of the atmosphere as they did, had they known 
of the ill effects, but BIP requires that past emitters actually committed some 
injustice. A principle which links responsibility to injustice that did not occur, but 
would have under a certain counterfactual, is more complex and more 
controversial than BIP and I will not consider it here.  
 
 
5.2.3 Bell’s Framework 
 
Derek Bell provides a nuanced attempt to show that past high emissions were 
unjust. He first draws a distinction between moral judgement from the “time-
neutral standpoint” and moral judgement from the “time-relative standpoint” 
(Bell 2011b: 402). According to this distinction, when we consider whether acts are 
blameworthy or invite punishment we should take the time-relative standpoint, and 
consider what information was available to the agent at the time of the act. But 
judgements about the rightness of actions, Bell believes, should be made with all 
                                                          
73Some of this recorded decrease is due to displaced emissions from manufacturing that are 
still serving European consumers, but have been released in Asia over this period. Still a large 
proportion is an (arguably deliberate) genuine reduction, due to increases in the use of clean 
energy and energy efficiency, and refinement of industrial processes.  
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the knowledge we have able to us now. 74 Thus, while historical acts such as 
burning large amounts of coal or converting rainforest to cropland were not 
blameworthy, we should, from the time-neutral standpoint, recognise they were 
unjust. Being unjust, BIP will apply to them, so those who possess the benefits 
from the unjust acts should use those benefits to help pay for the burdens that 
have been created. 
 
However, Bell is aware that this fundamental reliance on the time-neutral 
standpoint to assess the justness of acts is too crude. For always taking the time-
neutral standpoint would mean that some acts that are unfortunate but obviously 
not unjust would be counted as injustices. He uses the example of a kindly 
landlord who recognises the plight of some peasants and grants them a plot of 
land much better than what they have been working on. Soon after, a small 
meteorite hits the new patch of land, killing all the peasants. From the time-
neutral standpoint we see the harm he has caused, and his ignorance about the 
fate of the land is time-relative, so only protects the landlord from blame for an act 
that we must still (counter-intuitively) judge as unjust. 
 
To rule out such cases from his analysis, Bell distinguishes between unfortunate 
errors (like the landlord’s) and errors that can genuinely create injustice. Agents 
make errors that genuinely create injustice when they are mistaken about either a 
moral fact (Bell calls this a case of “moral ignorance”) or an empirical fact that is 
fundamental enough to concern the “circumstances of justice” (2011a: 406). The 
second type of error Bell calls “systematic moral error”, and includes ignorance 
about which goods are scarce and which are not. According to Bell, early heavy 
emitters were committing systematic moral error, for they were unaware that a 
good (the atmosphere’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases) that they were 
                                                          
74Bell accepts that such a view renders our judgements about justice of particular arrangement 
as fundamentally uncertain or “provisional” (2011a: 402); as we discover new information, we 
“may” (2011a: 402) (and, presumably, must when the information is clear enough) revise our 
assessment of the justness or otherwise of acts.  
The Just Allocation of Climate Burdens 
103 
 
claiming was actually a scarce good, rather than a limitless one. Thus, the 
combination of the time-neutral perspective, the supposition of systematic moral 
error, and an injustice-tracking principle such as BIP would entail that those who 
hold benefits born of the acts of heavy past emitting should bear the burdens.  
 
I agree that moral ignorance probably should be judged from the time-neutral 
standpoint. It also could be the case that “systematic moral error” about the 
circumstances of justice, such as the mistaken belief that everything was limitless 
or that there were conditions of extreme scarcity, could lead us to condemn acts 
committed under such conditions. We can rule a spree of looting unjust even if it 
was committed by someone who mistakenly believed that there had been a 
devastating nuclear holocaust which, if true, would have justified it. But past 
emitters were not ignorant of the circumstances of justice in the Humean or 
Rawlsian sense – they knew “that natural resources are not so abundant that 
schemes of cooperation become superfluous” (Rawls 1999: 110); they were merely 
unaware that one resource, which they thought was abundant, was actually quite 
scarce. So in order for Bell’s analysis to render heavy past emissions unjust, the 
scale of systematic error which can render acts unjust must be permitted to be 
much smaller.  
 
Mistakes about the scarcity of particular resources, however, do not immediately 
seem to be profound enough to render acts distributing such resources unjust, 
even if we take the time-neutral standpoint. Imagine a variation on the past 
emissions case, where actions were taken under a mistaken belief that a resource 
was scarce when in fact it was plentiful. Many foodstuffs were rationed during 
World War II, in a way that does not seem obviously unjust. Now suppose 
evidence, then unknowable, comes to light that sugar was not in fact scarce: that a 
plentiful alternative source (say) would certainly have been found if the price had 
risen high enough. Should we now re-evaluate the past rationing of sugar as being 
unjust? This seems too drastic; as with the landlord’s act in the previous example, 
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the act could be described as unfortunate, but not unjust. It is hard to see why we 
should be more severe in our judgement when a resource that was supposed to be 
limitless (indeed, hardly even recognisable as a resource) is now found to be 
scarce. 
 
More importantly, not all misconceptions about the abundance of resources lead 
to systematic moral error and thus injustice. For instance, no injustice would occur 
if a resource was mistakenly thought to be limitless but nonetheless was 
distributed fairly (from a time-neutral standpoint). To return to the case of climate 
change, if the distribution of the atmospheric sink was not unfair, even from the 
privileged position of the time-neutral standpoint, then BIP cannot apply to it. In 
the next sub-section I will argue that not all standards of fair distribution render 
the distribution of the atmospheric sink75 unjust, and the likely standards strong 
enough to render it so would motivate an “ability to pay” approach over BIP.  
 
 
5.2.4 An Unjust Distribution? 
 
Let us examine what considerations might render the distribution of the 
atmospheric sink unjust from the time-neutral standpoint. Some claim that heavy 
users of the atmospheric sink took more than their fair share. Such an idea seems 
to be behind Simon Caney’s description of why a quasi-BIP principle76 should 
apply to current benefits – because most the wealth of today’s affluent can be 
traced back to ‘unjustly high emissions’ (Caney 2009b: 243 [italics mine]). It is 
entailed by Eric Neumayer’s claim that we should assign “an equal share of the 
beneficent existence of the absorptive capacity of nature to every individual, 
                                                          
75“The atmospheric sink” is the atmosphere’s ability to absorb greenhouse gases without 
causing unacceptable climate change.  
76I call it a quasi-BP principle because Caney refers to his secondary principle as an “ability to 
pay principle” (2010: 213), yet it justifies asking the wealthy to pay because they have 
benefitted from past emissions, and thus incorporates the “beneficiary pays” idea.  
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independent of his or her place in either space or time”(Neumayer 2000: 188). 
Page also seems to support the notion that heavy past emitters used more than 
their share by comparing benefits from past heavy emissions to interest gained on 
stolen property (Page 2011). 
 
But this notion of a fair share of the atmospheric sink needs closer examination. A 
fair share, presumably, either would be that shared fairly intra-temporally 
(between parties across the generations) or inter-temporally (between the parties 
existing at one time). But neither can easily yield the result that current 
beneficiaries of past emissions should pay.  
 
Consider the inter-temporal version. This claim could concern aggregated parties, 
requiring that each generation deserves a fair amount of such goods; or 
disaggregated parties, requiring that each party, regardless of their position in 
time or space, deserves a fair share. Under the aggregated sense, the claim falters. 
Today’s generation is poorer than the past in terms of the flows from many of 
nature’s services including forests, fish stocks, wetlands and the atmospheric sink. 
But it is much richer in terms of information, knowledge, capital and labour. In 
essence, previous generations have consumed nature and bequeathed us culture, 
leaving us with a very different bundle of goods, but arguably not worse off in an 
aggregated sense.  
 
Now consider the disaggregated version, that each party deserves a fair share of 
resources regardless of when they exist. If this is true, the claim of unjust 
distribution between particular parties might hold water. Many privileged people, 
including past heavy emitters, have used up a swathe of natural resources, 
including the atmospheric sink. Due to climate change mitigation measures, most 
people in the near future, including those only moderately well-off, will probably 
face some restrictions on their use of the atmospheric sink, meaning that they will 
either not be permitted to access the same amount of it as others in history have, 
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or must pay for the privilege. This distribution of the atmospheric sink across 
parties and generations is unequal. Perhaps under some theories of distributive 
justice, it is therefore unjust. But it is important to see the implications of the 
theory which would be required to make it so. As I suggested in Chapter Four, 
rather than demanding that everyone holds the same amount of every good, the 
most plausible egalitarian theories focus either on the total bundle of resources 
that each party holds or on the well-being or capabilities that bundles of goods 
bring. Egalitarianism of every particular resource becomes even less palatable 
when applied inter-temporally. It would be ludicrous to demand that justice 
required every party have a particular or equal share of (say) gold, fur, and silicon 
across different times. Under a disaggregated, inter-temporal egalitarianism, 
injustice should be judged by the inequalities across a range of goods between 
people. And if that is the injustice, it is one that undermines the entitlement of 
today’s wealthy, just as much as it rules past high emitting as unjust. Thus it 
should require the wealthy to give up their wealth, which would justify an 
“ability to pay” principle over the narrower “beneficiary pays” principle.77  
 
The claim that systematic moral error led to an unjust distribution of access to the 
atmospheric sink inter-temporally is either false or supports an ability-based 
principle. Now we can turn to the suggestion that past heavy emitters, due to the 
illusion of limitlessness, took more than their fair share compared to their 
contemporaries. This is equally problematic. Most theories of distributive justice 
would not support this. Consider a sufficientarian view - that everyone should 
have enough of each important good. Given that no-one was prevented from 
accessing the atmospheric sink in say, 1930, it is hard to see how anyone then 
could not have had sufficient of this good to meet their needs. A prioritarian 
theory - that resources should be directed to the least advantaged – would also 
                                                          
77Perhaps one could say in this case that those who have benefits derived from such injustice 
have two reasons to surrender their benefits, and that those who are merely able to pay have 
one. But having more reasons to do something is not the same as having a stronger reason to 
do it, or a reason to do more of it (Dancy, 2004: 16-25). 
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deny that intra-temporal injustice occurred. The least advantaged person in 1930, 
for instance, would not have benefitted from being granted more of the 
atmospheric sink, if such a grant would have meant anything at all. In the sense 
that they were prevented from using the atmospheric sink, this was due to their 
lack of quite different resources. Finally, Rawls’ difference principle, that any 
inequality must raise the position of the least well off (Rawls 1999: 52-65), is not 
obviously violated by some getting more of the atmospheric sink than their 
contemporaries. Had past heavy users been restricted from their unequal use, the 
increased prices of manufactured goods and the reduction in benefits of 
technological development and cheap energy would have probably led the worst 
off of the same generation to become more so.  
 
It is true that an egalitarian committed to an equal distribution of goods may see 
the distribution of the atmospheric sink within past generations as unjust, 
meaning that BIP could apply. But as was the case when we considered the inter-
temporal disaggregated version, reasonable egalitarians should have at least as 
much reason to support an alternative principle, the “ability to pay” principle. For 
once again it is not that everyone should have the same amount of hemp or 
toothpaste or atmospheric sink at a particular time, but that people should possess 
an equal bundle of goods, or reach equal levels of a subjective measure such as 
capabilities or well-being. This commitment to overall equality would once again 
be best served by asking the most well-off to pay for the no-fault burden, rather 
than linking responsibility to the benefits gained from what may have been (by 
egalitarian lights) a past injustice between contemporaries. 
 
Whether past heavy emissions involved injustice depends on our view of 
distributive justice and the appropriate parties with which comparisons of 
holdings can be made. However, I have argued that reasonable versions of such 
views must either deny that past emissions were unjust, or affirm they were 
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unjust but motivate an “ability to pay” principle to allocate responsibility for 
them, making BIP redundant.  
 
 
5.3 BHP – BENEFITTING FROM HARM 
 
5.3.1 Against the BHP Principle 
 
BIP is not the only way in which the “ability to pay” approach could allocate 
responsibility for the climate change burden. There is room for a quite different 
approach, which does not rely, as BIP does, on past emissions constituting an 
injustice. Such an approach only tries to show that the rich today are beneficiaries 
of acts which are causing or will cause future harm due to climate change. Under 
this view, we should not demand special duties of the beneficiaries because they 
benefitted from injustice, but because, and to the extent that, their benefits bear a 
special relation to these harmful acts (Das in preparation; Gosseries 2004; Page 
2008; Shue 1999). Thus we can examine a principle such as the following: 
 
Beneficiary of Harmful Acts Pays (BHP) Those holding benefits from acts or 
practices that are causing or will cause harm should bear the burden of rectifying 
the harm, until the harm has been fully rectified or the benefits that triggered the 
duty have been exhausted. 
 
Unlike BIP, this principle would be clearly applicable to those holding benefits 
due to past acts producing high emissions. It is obvious that many parties have 
received benefits from industrial practices that will cause severe harms. The only 
problem with BHP is that the principle is implausible, because it is too 
demanding.  
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Here is a counterexample. Beth might happily marry Adam, benefitting greatly, 
but in the process breaking Henry’s heart. It seems fair to say that Beth does not 
owe rectification to Henry for the suffering such an act causes. In another 
counterexample, Ben goes into business in a market environment, and, through 
skill and good sense, out-competes Henriette. Again, Ben benefits from entering 
this market, and Henriette suffers, but Ben does not thus owe reparations to 
Henriette (examples from D. Miller 2001: 460).  
 
Perhaps we might be tempted to amend BHP to get around these types of 
examples, judging that BHP only applies where there is an element of 
voluntariness involved. Perhaps we do not assign special responsibility to Beth 
and Ben because Henry and Henriette knew the risks they were running by 
getting into affairs of the heart and business affairs respectively. This might lead 
to a principle like: 
 
BHP’ Those holding benefits from acts or practices that are causing or will cause 
harm that are suffered by victims who have not at least tacitly consented to bear the 
risks of such harm should bear the burden of rectifying the harm, until the harm 
has been fully rectified or the benefits that triggered the duty have been 
exhausted.  
 
BHP’ would allow Beth and Ben in the examples above to escape responsibility for 
the harm they caused, but would not allow the current beneficiaries of past 
emissions to escape responsibility for climate change, for those to be harmed by 
past emissions did not even tacitly consent to the risk of such harms. But the 
addition of the criterion of non-voluntariness may not be enough to render BHP’ 
plausible. To return to our example, it is not clear that Beth or Ben would have 
significant responsibility to rectify the situation, even if it turned out that the 
“victims” in those cases were (say) naïve teenagers without the experience to have 
made tacit consent to the risks they faced. This is especially the case if Beth and 
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Ben were ignorant, as past emitters were, of the especially vulnerable nature of 
those who will be harmed. Consider also a patient whose life is saved due to a 
triage decision at the expense of another, while both were unconscious. Although 
tacit consent was not given by the patient who dies, justice demands nothing 
extraordinary from the survivor to the family of the deceased. The amendment to 
BHP requiring the absence of tacit consent is not enough to render the ensuing 
principle plausible and so BHP’ cannot guide us in allocating the historical portion 
of the climate change burden.  
 
 
5.3.2 Gosseries’ Argument and a Reply.  
 
Axel Gosseries (2004) argues for two separate claims that in combination would, 
like BHP, judge current beneficiaries of past emissions morally liable for the 
historical portion of the climate burden. First, Gosseries argues that past emitters, 
if they were still around, would gain moral liability for the harms they caused, 
even when they could not have known of these harms. Second, he argues that 
such liability should be transferred to current parties who have received the 
benefits from past emitters. The second claim may be plausible, and I will not 
discuss it here. But the first claim, I will argue, relies on a principle that suffers the 
same problem as BHP and BHP’ - it is too demanding.  
 
Gosseries admits that past emitting was not unjust: “the past US generation never 
wronged Bangladesh [through their high emissions]” (2004: 44). After all, past 
emissions were made under ignorance of their harmful effects. Nonetheless, he 
believes, while past emitters may not have committed a wrong; if they were still 
around they would incur moral liability for the harmful consequences of their 
actions. To defend this claim, Gosseries advocates a principle he calls the 
“modified excusable ignorance principle (MIEX)” (Gosseries 2004: 40).  
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A person should not be held morally responsible for the harmful consequences of 
her own act if they were unknown to her and could not reasonably have been 
known at the time of the action. However, she may still be held liable for 
compensation for such harmful consequences on others if and only if once the 
latter were or should have been brought to light, she still enjoyed correlative 
benefits (Gosseries 2004: 40). 
 
MIEX is a specific form of the “ability to pay” idea. It refers to benefits gained by a 
person’s own actions, and specifies that the possession of these benefits is what 
determines liability for harms undertaken under ignorance. Gosseries eventually 
wants to extend such liability to the current beneficiaries of others’ harmful acts, 
in particular, past acts of high emissions. But we should not even judge past 
emitters liable for the harm from their emitting, for MIEX is implausible.  
 
To motivate MIEX, Gosseries presents an example. Roberto happens to find a 
large sum of money, (which unbeknownst to him is actually counterfeit) and uses 
it to buy 50 bottles of wine. By the time the wine-seller finds that the notes happen 
to be counterfeit, Roberto has drunk 10 of the bottles. Gosseries suggests that in 
this case, we should ask that Roberto return at least the remaining 40 bottles – for 
these are benefits he still enjoys from the harmful act of passing over the 
counterfeit notes.  
 
I agree that Roberto should return the 40 bottles of wine, but I think this just 
illustrates that only some unwittingly harmful acts generate liability for the harms 
caused, specifically, those acts where the harm is due to an injustice. Although 
what Roberto did was not unjust, if he keeps the 40 bottles of wine, his benefits 
can be easily traced to an unjust act: that of the counterfeiter. MIEX is too 
demanding because it allows harm alone to undermine the claims people have to 
their holdings. Consider a similar thought experiment, where the notes were not 
counterfeit, but accidentally defective, so that they were especially susceptible to 
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disintegration when exposed to light. They disintegrate while in the wine-seller’s 
possession. Would we then demand that Roberto return the bottles? I think not. 
He has still benefitted from a harmful act that can be described in a very similar 
way to the first case – unwittingly buying wine with notes that have no 
permanent value. But I doubt he is obliged to return anything in this case. The 
morally relevant difference seems to me to be that in the first case, Roberto’s 
benefits can be traced relatively easily to an act of injustice: the counterfeiter’s act 
of producing fake notes. The association of Roberto’s benefits with such an 
injustice, rather than with the harm itself, is what removes the claim Roberto has 
to his benefits.78  
 
Once again it seems that it is injustice which removes the entitlement of 
beneficiaries to their holdings. BIP is a plausible principle but BHP and MIEX are 
not.  
 
5.4 Postscript: The Limited Responsibility of Beneficiaries 
 
It may seem that I have been too harsh on the “beneficiary pays” idea, particularly 
on BHP’. Does morality really permit leaving the naïve and unfortunate victim to 
suffer while one stands by holding goods born from the very act that has caused 
their suffering? This is an interesting question, but it frames the problem 
deceptively. It is just for beneficiaries to refrain from assisting victims, when one 
or other alternative principle already requires support for the victims of harm – 
                                                          
78Perhaps a supporter of Gosseries’ approach might try to find other examples of not unjust 
harmful acts that still make the beneficiary of such acts liable. For instance, say the notes in the 
above example had been legal tender taken from a stranger and hidden in Roberto’s house by 
children (this example was suggested to me by Ramon Das). We might be tempted to say that, 
while there was no injustice here, Roberto should return the bottles. But I believe it is again an 
injustice which grounds the duty Roberto has to return the bottles in this case. That Roberto 
consumed property that rightfully belonged to another was an injustice, and so BIP or some 
similar principle applies. But past emitters, as I have argued in Section 4.2, were not 
unwittingly using something that belonged to someone else, because they did not take more 
than their fair share of the atmospheric sink.  
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either from those who are most able to provide it, or those with special 
relationships with the victim. Disaster relief tends to come from national funds, 
not from the pockets of those few who might have benefitted from the disaster; 
care of the broken-hearted comes from family and friends, not from those who 
have benefitted from the affair. In some cases it might be noble for those who have 
reaped extra benefits from a calamity to aid those in strife, but it is not usually 
required by justice. The “ability to pay” approach (which I have argued is best 
suited to allocate the no-fault burden) allows victims of severe misfortune to have 
their needs seen to without relying on the rather accidental connection between 
the innocent harmer and the victim. 
 
Over the last two chapters, I have argued that an “ability to pay” principle is more 
appropriate than a “beneficiary pays” principle in most cases of innocent harm. 
Still, the “beneficiary pays” approach could be appropriate in a certain subset of 
such innocent-harm situations: when there is little or no hope that those with the 
ability to pay will actually pay. This may be especially so in the non-consensual 
cases we considered such as triage, and the naive business-owners. If there is no 
safety net of minimal support provided by some institution which allows the 
burden of meeting non-consensual victims’ most vital needs to be shared fairly 
among those with the ability to pay, and no-one with special connections to the 
victim will provide support then one might think it unjust for the beneficiary of 
innocent harm to ignore pleas for help from the non-consensual victims.  
 
Does the case of innocent harm caused to climate victims meet these criteria? The 
answer is somewhat complicated. Parties who do presently have the ability to pay 
for the climate tasks cannot in good faith demand that, due to the lack of an ability 
to pay system, parties who have benefitted from past emissions have a duty to 
take up the associated burden. Although global cooperation on climate change 
action is presently woefully inadequate, there is still hope that a strong institution 
based on just principles will develop. What is more, who, if not those with the 
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ability to pay, are in a position to allow and encourage such an institution to 
develop? That being said, victims of climate change or their advocates, frustrated 
by the lack of such institutions, might plausibly point to the fact that many parties 
have benefitted as an extra reason why certain parties should take the lead. But 
this is a case of frustrated parties appealing to a principle of justice that is third-
best. Those who are wealthy should bear the cost of past emissions, and the reason 
why they should is because they are wealthy.  
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6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Human induced climate change presents us collectively with a climate burden, 
comprising several tasks: to try to reduce the probability that high levels of 
warming will occur, to enable some potential victims to avoid some of the worst 
effects, and to compensate those who will be harmed. In this thesis I have 
defended what I call a two-track approach which separates the burden of climate 
change into two parts: the “fault” burden and the “no-fault” burden. The fault 
burden is that which has been created by greenhouse gas emissions since the time 
it has been reasonable to suppose that such emissions cause harm, not counting 
the emissions needed to support people’s basic needs. The no-fault burden is the 
rest: the burden caused by emissions before it was reasonable to suppose that such 
emissions caused harms, and the burden caused by people merely meeting their 
basic needs.  
 
In Chapter Two I investigated Dale Jamieson’s claim that the responsibility to deal 
with climate change is too far from a paradigm case of moral or political 
responsibility, and thus requires a revisionary approach to fully explain the 
urgency and strength of such responsibility (Jamieson 2007, 2010). I argued that, 
while climate change does possess some unusual features (a long and time-lagged 
causal chain, a lack of intention to harm, and geographically and temporally 
dispersed causers of harm) a revisionary approach is unnecessary. Instead, 
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principles of burden-sharing can allocate proportionate responsibility to the 
dispersed emitters. Once such responsibility has been apportioned, the other 
unusual features of climate change do not significantly threaten the clarity or 
urgency of the moral responsibility entailed by such principles. Furthermore, the 
scale of the harm, the forward-looking nature of climate ethics, and the precision 
that some principles can bring to the allocation of proportionate responsibility to 
act on climate change render climate ethics more, rather than less, paradigm.  
 
In Chapter Three I turned to the practice of ‘grandfathering’ emissions rights – 
granting more rights to emit greenhouse gases to those who have emitted more in 
the past. Luc Bovens (2011) has made a unique attempt at defending such a 
practice on moral grounds. His is a Lockean approach, that claims that past use of 
a resource, when enough and as good is left for others and it is not wasted, 
generates title to that resource. Bovens’ version of a Lockean approach faces two 
major problems. First, it rests on what may be a problematic analogy between the 
atmosphere’s ability to absorb CO2 and other goods once held in common. Second, 
both the enough-and-as-good condition and the no-waste condition have been 
thoroughly violated, meaning even a Lockean account should judge that past 
emitters have lost their title to the atmospheric sink. 
 
In Chapter Four I developed my positive account. I stressed that a key step in 
apportioning climate burdens fairly is dividing the fault burden from the “no-
fault burden”. It is just to ask those polluting now and who polluted in the recent 
past to bear the burdens caused by their pollution, unless doing so would cause 
the very kind of harm to people’s livelihoods that the climate tasks are aimed to 
prevent. Thus the fault burden is that generated from the greenhouse gas 
emissions produced now and in the recent past, by those not suffering severe 
poverty. Conversely, the no-fault burden is that generated by past emissions, 
produced while it was not reasonable to suppose that such emissions could cause 
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harm; and the emissions from the very poor. A “polluter pays” principle, I argued, 
fairly distributes the fault burden.  
 
I considered the objection that past emissions should also be included in the fault 
burden, but rejected it. The objection, I argued, can take one of two forms, neither 
of which succeed. The first form claims that parties should bear the burdens of 
their acts that caused high emissions because they benefitted from those acts. I 
argued against such a “beneficiary pays” approach in Chapter Five. The second 
form is that past heavy emitters should bear the burdens of their acts regardless of 
whether they benefitted, because strict liability should apply in this case. Henry 
Shue (1999) supports this form of the objection because he believes that allowing 
major past polluters to pass burdens they created onto others is incompatible with 
the principle of equal dignity. This view underestimates the value of a just 
secondary principle that can distribute the no-fault burden. Others support strict 
liability in the case of climate change by referring to the legal precedent of 
allocating strict liability to parties for actions taken in ignorance of their harmful 
effects. But strict liability has been applied in law only in special cases. It would be 
unusual for us to apply strict liability to an act that was not inherently dangerous 
or unusual. 
 
Having divided the climate burden into the fault burden and the no-fault burden, 
I then turned to the question of how the no-fault burden should be distributed. I 
proposed that, for this burden, parties should bear it in proportion to their ability 
to do so. What this would mean, I argued in Chapter Four, is that each party 
should bear a portion of the no-fault burden that constitutes an equal 
proportionate drop in wealth, perhaps calibrated on a non-linear scale to take into 
account non-material views of the appropriate currency of justice.  
 
There are many climate tasks of mitigation, adaptation and compensation, but the 
application of the two-track theory I have advocated to the restriction of emissions 
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is especially interesting. First I argued that, despite the “ability to pay” principle, 
emissions need to be significantly restricted now. Even if we could be sure that 
many parties in future generations will be much wealthier than us, the “ability to 
pay” principle does not allow us to transform the task of mitigation into the task 
of compensation. To do so would be to knowingly let people’s vital interests be 
harmed only because we promise later compensation, which is unacceptable. So 
we must restrict emissions. When it comes to allocating these restricted emissions, 
there is no reason why emissions rights must be allocated either to states or to 
individuals. Such rights could be sold via an auction to the corporations that 
initiate the processes that end in pollution (mining fossil fuels for example). Costs 
would filter through to the users of greenhouse-gas-intensive products, meaning 
the “polluter pays” principle would be respected, while some of the revenue 
raised through the auction could be spent to ensure that those with less ability to 
pay bear less of the costs of emissions restriction than those with more ability to 
pay.  
 
In Chapter Five I examined an alternative secondary principle for distributing the 
no-fault burden (or at least its historic portion): that those who have benefitted 
from past emissions should pay. The justification for this “beneficiary pays” 
principle can take either of two forms. Those who have benefitted from past 
emissions, it is sometimes said, should pay for the associated burdens because 
they have benefitted from an injustice. But it is unclear exactly what the injustice 
of past emissions consists of. Only a strict egalitarian would deem past high 
emitting unjust, and such a strict egalitarian should support the use of an “ability 
to pay” principle over a “beneficiary pays” principle regardless. The second form 
of the “beneficiary pays” idea is that those who have benefitted from past 
emissions should pay because they have benefitted from a harmful act. But this 
justification is too demanding. If we have any responsibilities to help those 
harmed by (not unjust) actions that benefit us, they are responsibilities of last 
resort, to be called upon only when the institutions that are meant to protect the 
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vulnerable are missing. But we have a chance to create just institutions to protect 
the victims of the no fault burden, and we should do so on the basis of a different 
principle – that parties should bear burdens in proportion to their ability to do so.  
 
Climate change presents us with a complex, but not impossible task: that of 
allocating the burden of the climate change. Close analysis of the varied sources of 
the climate burden, the purpose of bearing it, and the principles that could 
potentially allocate it will allow us to do so in a fair way. I have argued that we 
need a two-track approach, with a “polluter pays” principle that is sensitive to 
both severe poverty and excusable ignorance allocating the fault burden, and an 
“ability to pay” principle allocating the no-fault burden. The two-track scheme can 
be practically implemented, most promisingly perhaps by an auction-and-
dividend scheme. The climate burden can be borne fairly if those of us who have 
knowingly created burdens (and are not desperately poor) can bear those burdens 
that we have created, and the remaining burden is divided among us all in 
proportion to our ability to bear it.  
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